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Abstract 
 
Who is poor? For decades, the Official Poverty Measure largely answered this question. 
Using measures of material hardship in the Survey of Income and Program Participation, it is 
clear that concrete material hardships extend far above the federal poverty line. 18% of all 
households experience this hidden material hardship above the poverty line, largely ignored by 
policy makers, ineligible for social assistance programs, and obscured by conventional poverty 
measures themselves.  The duration of spells of material hardship indicate that a far larger 
proportion of the population is at risk of hardship than is commonly thought. Over a third of 
households experience either chronic or episodic hardship, compared the fifth of households in 
chronic or episodic poverty.  
Racial disparities in the experience of material hardship are stark. Even when taking other 
demographic factors and wealth into account, the risk of experiencing material hardship for a 
white household earning $50,000 a year is similar to a black household that earns $125,000. A 
white household with a head who has a high school diploma has the same predicted probability 
of experiencing material hardship as a black household with head who has a bachelor’s degree. 
The events and shocks that trigger entry into, and exit from, a spell of hardship display similar 
racial disparities. 
The main implication of these findings is that the current social safety net does not 
address the vast majority of households in material hardship, nor is it capable of doing so in its 
current configuration. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Sociology and social work grew out of a similar set of intellectual and practical concerns 
about human welfare in the face of rapid urbanization and industrialization in 19th century 
Europe and North America. Early social scientists and social reformers engaged in studies of the 
material conditions under which the new urban working classes lived (e.g. Du Bois 1899; Engels 
1845; Kellogg 1909; Residents of Hull House 1895) in order to both understand the social world 
in and of itself and to provide an empirical basis for efforts aimed at ameliorating these social 
problems. 
This approach of using the tools of social science to understand the world as it is in the 
service of both social science for its own sake and as a basis for evidence-based social reform 
continued on into the middle 20th century, albeit with some important shifts in methods and 
assumptions that continue to influence contemporary poverty scholarship1. Since the 1960s, 
federal money has been used to fund research centers inside the government, in academia, and in 
the non-profit sector. These efforts to understand the causes and consequences of poverty share a 
few key features that continue to influence the course of poverty research today. Alice O’Connor 
(2001) argues that it was in this moment that an “analytical” turn in poverty research took place, 
a turn that emphasized quantitative methods over qualitative methods, that assumed the inherent 
capability of markets to produce optimal outcomes, that understood poverty primarily as a matter 
of income, and saw individual human capital as the key to solving the problem of poverty. 
                                                
1 In many ways, this shift is not dissimilar to the one experienced by American sociology as a whole in the wake of 
the Second World War (Steinmetz 2005) 
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Poverty knowledge was, in short, dominated by a utilitarian perspective that emphasized 
atomistic rational actors, placed economists and survey researchers at the center of poverty 
research, and pushed sociologists, anthropologists, and social workers to the periphery. All of 
this came at the expense of understandings of poverty that investigated the roles of communities, 
political economy, or other structural forces. The consequence of this form of poverty 
knowledge, O’Connor argues, was a body of seemingly objective and empirical ways of 
assessing the social world that proved open to radical reinterpretation by conservative foes of the 
welfare state like Charles Murray. By treating poverty as merely a matter of income, by 
understanding individual level behavior as the ultimate source of and solution to poverty, by 
theoretically isolating poverty from larger issues of political economy, mid to late 20th century 
poverty knowledge had created the intellectual field necessary to begin attacking and dismantling 
the welfare state. By the 1980s and 1990s, the primary concern in this area of research was 
welfare dependency, not fighting poverty. 
What is needed now in the field of poverty research is an approach that rejects some of 
the misleading assumptions embedded in mid-late 20th century poverty research, and that begins 
to connect research on the micro level and the level of political economy. This dissertation is a 
step in this direction.  
The first empirical chapter examines an alternative measure of poverty—material 
hardship—and contrasts it with the conventional measure of income poverty. Material hardship 
measures reveal that a far larger segment of the population, about a quarter of all households, 
experiences some type of material hardship. The majority, 73%, of households in material 
hardship, approximately 18% of all households, experience material hardship above the poverty 
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line, and have thus been largely invisible to social scientists and ineligible for social assistance 
programs.  
The second empirical chapter takes advantage of the only repeated measures of material 
hardship in a nationally representative survey to measure the temporal depth of material 
hardship. These data reveal that a significant portion of the population, roughly 45%, move into 
or out of material hardship or income poverty over a two year period of time. In other words, 
only slightly over half of American households are economically secure over a short length of 
time.  
The third empirical chapter uses these repeated measures of material hardship to assess 
the impact of events and unexpected household shocks such as unemployment, additional 
children, unstable incomes, and moves or relocations on the experience of material hardship. The 
role of various forms of social assistance, such as increased social assistance or informal support 
from friends and family are also examined for their role in helping households transition out of a 
spell of material hardship.  
Across all three empirical chapters, a consistent theme emerges. First, sizable and durable 
racial disparities mark the risk of experiencing material hardship across the income ladder. 
Institutions may be shifting risk onto households (Hacker 2006), the welfare state may be 
increasingly targeting married, working, households with children (Moffitt, R. 2014), extreme 
poverty and disconnection from both work and welfare may be emerging social problems 
(Danziger 2010; Shaefer and Edin 2013), expanded access to consumer credit may be a 
substitute for greater redistribution (Krippner 2011; Prasad 2012), but the end result is society 
that dramatically distributes the risk of material hardship along racial lines.  
 4 
Karl Polanyi (Block and Somers 2014; Polanyi 2001) provides a theoretical framework 
for what happens when a society attempts to fully commodify the fictitious commodities of land, 
labor, and money. Through the increasing shift of risk and responsibility away from institutions 
and on to households, the transformation of the welfare state into the workfare state, increased 
stratification, the results are human lives increasingly lived according to the vagaries of the 
market. The fear lurking in the background of this dissertation is that Polanyi is right, that the 
utopian project of neoliberalism will end in tears before too long. Indeed, there is some anecdotal 
evidence that the “center cannot hold”, that this society is coming apart at the seams. Even if we 
avoid the worst, we will need clear-eyed, empirical sociology and social work to guide us as we 
rebuild and adapt.  
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Chapter 2 Hidden Hardship in the United States 
 
Introduction 
 The question of who should be counted as poor and who not is an unavoidable and 
recurrent question in poverty research. At some point, any empirical investigation is forced to 
clearly define poverty (Smeeding 2016). This question of categorizing people as poor or non-
poor has occupied the attention of social scientists, state officials, and their predecessors dating 
back at least to the 17th century Elizabethan Poor Laws (Katz 2013). Michael Harrington (1962: 
176-177) acknowledges that “in such a discussion it is inevitable that one gets mixed up with 
dry, graceless technical matters.” Despite this seemingly arid terrain, the scholarly and practical 
stakes for any such definition are high. Harrington continued on to note that this “should not 
conceal the crucial fact that these numbers represent people.”  
 Every fall the U.S. Census Bureau releases a report based on the Current Population 
Survey in which the new poverty rate is announced. Headlines indicate if the rate went up or 
down, and pundits dust off their talking points about poverty. Rarely does this coverage get into 
the dry and graceless technical matters of poverty measurement and definition. Instead, the way 
poverty is talked about in the United States is almost invariably through the lens of one particular 
understanding of poverty: income poverty.   
Despite often being reduced to a measure of income, poverty is a complex, 
multidimensional social phenomenon. Proponents of multidimensional approaches of 
conceptualizing and measuring poverty (e.g. Dhongde and Haveman 2015) often point to the 
 6 
capabilities approach of Amartya Sen which understands poverty not just as low income, but as 
the deprivation of the capabilities one needs in order to “lead the kind of lives they value” 
(1999:18). Poverty then is a social problem because it deprives people of the capabilities 
necessary for some minimum level of human freedom. This shift in the conception of poverty 
away from income—which is only instrumentally but not intrinsically important— opens up the 
possibility of factors beyond income determining poverty, and suggests that the relationship 
between poverty and low income is not as direct as often thought and may vary over time and 
space.   
This understanding of poverty as not just an arbitrary line in the sand, but as a condition 
or situation in which one is not free to live the kind of life one values is not confined to late 20th 
century academic scholarship, rather it can be found in American popular political discourse. 
The tension between poverty and actual existing freedom in daily life was a central line of 
thinking in New Deal political theory (Stipelman 2012). President Roosevelt argued that, “[w]e 
have come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual freedom cannot exist without 
economic security and independence. ‘Necessitous men are not free men.’ People who are 
hungry and out of a job are the stuff of which dictatorships are made” (Roosevelt 1944). 
Roosevelt then goes even farther than Sen in understanding poverty as not just a problem for the 
individual or the household, but a social problem that threatened to destabilize the political 
system as a whole. If Sen and Roosevelt are right, then the conception of poverty adopted by 
social scientists, social workers, and the government should be about more than just income, it 
should be an attempt to assess who has the material conditions necessary to live a free and 
meaningful life.  
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Measures of material hardship provide the most direct approach to measuring the concept 
at the core of poverty research: deprivation. This paper considers common measures of poverty, 
such as the Official Poverty Measure (the federal “poverty line”), and compares them to 
measures of material hardship. Instead of two groups, the poor and non-poor, I find four: 1) 
economically secure households that avoid both poverty and material hardship, 2) households in 
hardship above the poverty line, 3) households that despite being below the poverty line manage 
to get by without experiencing material hardship, and 4) down-and-out households that report 
both hardship and income poverty. This chapter focuses on households in hardship above the 
poverty line. I refer this category of hardship as hidden hardship because it is invisible using 
conventional income measures of poverty and therefore largely excluded from key social safety 
net programs. I describe this group in hidden hardship in terms of of their demographic 
characteristics, income, wealth, and debt. Stark disparities by race and education that persist even 
when income and wealth are taken into account in multivariate regression models.  
Measuring Poverty 
In the middle of the 20th century, the US government devised a measure of poverty, the 
Official Poverty Measure (OPM), which has profoundly shaped the social scientific 
understanding of poverty in America, and in turn social policy responses to the problem of 
poverty. For both social scientists and in every day speech, to speak of poverty in the United 
States is nearly always to speak of income poverty as defined by the poverty line (O’Connor 
2001).  
Despite the criticisms of the OPM, it remains an important and relevant measure because 
it is related to the Department of Health and Human Services Poverty Thresholds. The HHS 
Poverty Thresholds are essentially equivalent to the poverty line but are rounded to convenient 
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dollar amounts and serve as the eligibility guidelines for numerous safety net programs. Thirty-
one safety net programs use the HHS Poverty Guidelines2, or multiples thereof, to determine 
eligibility whereas only six means tested programs do not use the poverty guidelines3. Finding 
oneself on one side of this arbitrary line can mean the difference between receiving food stamps, 
heating subsidies, and health insurance, or not (US Department of Health & Human Services 
n.d.).   
The disadvantages of this measure are well known: it is based on pre-tax income and thus 
ignores the effects of key antipoverty policies; adjustments for inflation since 1963 may not be 
sufficient to fully reflect changes in the standard of living; essential costs such as transportation, 
child care, and medical expenses are ignored; geographical disparities are not addressed; and 
family size adjustments do not reflect the complexity of contemporary household arrangements 
(e.g. cohabiting non-married couples, child support obligations, etc.) (Citro and Michael 1995).  
As a result, some sociologists have called for researchers to abandon absolute measures such as 
the OPM in favor of relative measures of poverty in which a specific point in the income 
distribution is chosen as the poverty threshold (Brady 2003; Townsend 1979). In the United 
                                                
2 Programs that do use the HHS poverty guidelines: Community Services Block Grant, Head Start, Low-Income 
Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP), some elements of Medicaid, Hill-Burton Uncompensated Services 
Program, AIDS Drug Assistance Program, Children’s Health Insurance Program, Medicare – Prescription Drug 
Coverage (subsidized portion only), Community Health Centers, Migrant Health Centers, Family Planning Services, 
Health Professions Student Loans — Loans for Disadvantaged Students, Health Careers Opportunity Program, 
Scholarships for Health Professions Students from Disadvantaged Backgrounds, Job Opportunities for Low-Income 
Individuals, Assets for Independence Demonstration Program, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) 
(formerly Food Stamp Program), Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children 
(WIC)National School Lunch Program (for free and reduced-price meals only),School Breakfast Program (for free 
and reduced-price meals only), Child and Adult Care Food Program (for free and reduced-price meals only), 
Expanded Food and Nutrition Education Program, Weatherization Assistance for Low-Income Persons, Job Corps, 
National Farmworker Jobs Program, Senior Community Service Employment Program, Workforce Investment Act 
Youth Activities, Low-Income Taxpayer Clinics, Foster Grandparent Program, Senior Companion Program, Legal 
Services for the Poor.   
3 The means tested programs that do not use the HHS Poverty Guidelines are Supplemental Security Income (SSI), 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), state/local-funded general assistance (in most cases), some parts of Medicaid, 
Section 8 low-income housing assistance, and low-rent public housing. 
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Kingdom, for example, the poverty line is often defined as 60% of median income (Townsend 
and Kennedy 2004) and the OECD often defines poverty as half of the median income (OECD 
2014).  
In contrast to absolute measures of income poverty in which there is a clear poverty line 
that may move to keep pace with inflation, relative poverty lines function more like measures of 
inequality than poverty. At their core, relative income measures of poverty acknowledge that full 
participation in a given society is dependent upon one’s ability to purchase the goods and 
services necessary to partake in mainstream social experiences. This concern over being able to 
fully participate in society has led to the concept of social exclusion taking center stage in many 
European studies of poverty (Atkinson and Davoudi 2000). Recently, the Census Bureau has 
developed a new quasi-relative measure, the Supplemental Poverty Measure (SMP), which 
addresses these concerns while combining some of the strengths of both the absolute and relative 
measures of income poverty (Johnson and Smeeding 2012).  
The OPM and the SPM, as well as the relative measures of poverty favored by Brady and 
most European social scientists, are all measures of income poverty. All measures of income 
poverty set some sort of income cutoff below which an individual or household is considered 
poor. Recently, some economists have called for an increased focus on consumption measures of 
poverty, a perspective that leads to lower estimates of poverty compared to income-based 
measures of poverty (Meyer and Sullivan 2012). The idea behind these consumption measures is 
that material well-being is quantified through detailed reporting of consumption rather than 
attempting to have respondents report income. While conceptually interesting, the available data 
are limited due to their reliance on one relatively small survey that was not designed with this 
task in mind (the Consumer Expenditure Survey). Furthermore, the consumption literature does 
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not appear to have any way of establishing what a sufficient level of consumption (and thus, by 
implication, income) might be other than referring back to the OPM. It also doesn’t account for 
the role of debt in propping up consumption. Finally, trends in the consumption measure of 
poverty as put into practice by Meyer and Sullivan do not match trends in either material 
hardship or income poverty measures. While other measures of poverty show increases over the 
past two decades, especially during the Great Recession era, Meyer and Sullivan-style 
consumption poverty measures largely falls during this time period (Shaefer and Rivera 2017).  
One possible way to move past the debate between relative and absolute measures of 
income poverty, and between income poverty and consumption poverty, is to directly investigate 
the material consequences of poverty (Ouellette et al. 2004). Consider the most sophisticated 
measure of poverty devised by the Census Bureau, the Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM). 
This measure establishes an income cutoff adjusted for household composition and geographic 
area that is based on a rolling average of the cost of food, clothing, shelter, utilities, and medical 
expenses (the measure then adds an extra 20% to this figure to account for unexpected expenses). 
The implicit assumption behind the SPM is that an inability to afford food, clothing, shelter, 
basic utilities, medical care, and other essential life expenses is at the heart of contemporary 
concerns over poverty. The core concern is not income per se, but these material necessities. 
Income in and of itself is thus a proxy for a household’s ability to acquire these goods and 
services. But why stick with a proxy if it is possible to measure material hardship directly? Why 
not measure directly whether households are able to meet expenses considered fundamental to 
human flourishing such as food, shelter, utilities, and medical care? 
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Material Hardship as a Poverty Measure 
Despite extensive scholarly research related to poverty, particularly since the War on 
Poverty in the 1960s, the question of material hardship was not raised directly until the late 
1980s. As part of her dissertation research, Susan Mayer (1986) fielded a survey of Chicago area 
residents to understand how income was related to material hardship. In this survey, she created 
measures of material hardship that were clear and easy to recall by survey respondents. These 
measures included questions about the inability to secure enough food, to pay rent, to afford 
needed medical care, etc. She found that the link between material hardship and income poverty 
was surprisingly weak. At best, income poverty could explain 14% of the variance in material 
hardship (Mayer and Jencks 1989). A family’s place respective of the official poverty line and 
their experiences of concrete material deprivation such as hunger and housing instability had a 
surprisingly small overlap.  
Measures of material hardship have only been used by a handful of scholars, such as Kurt 
Bauman (Bauman 1999, 2002; Carle, Bauman, and Short 2009), Sondra Beverly (Beverly 1999, 
2000, 2001), Sandra Danziger (Danziger et al. 2000), Colleen Heflin (Heflin 2006), John Iceland 
(Iceland and Bauman 2007), Gesimia Nelson (Nelson 2011) and Luke Shaefer (Shaefer, Edin, 
and Talbert 2015; Shaefer and Gutierrez 2013; Shaefer and Ybarra 2012). Matthew Desmond has 
repeatedly addressed one form of material hardship, eviction (Desmond 2012, 2016; Desmond 
and Kimbro 2015).  Compared to income-based measures of poverty, material hardship has 
remained a niche measure in part due to data limitations. Material hardship questions in the vein 
of Mayer and Jencks (1989) do not appear regularly on any national survey. They do appear 
sporadically as special topical modules to the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP) and have appeared in targeted surveys such as the Women’s Employment Survey 
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(Danziger, Sandra K. et al. 2000; Sullivan, Turner, and Danziger 2008) and in qualitative work 
(e.g. Edin and Lein 1997). Measures of food insecurity, despite being developed in the 1990s as 
well, have spawned a much larger literature (e.g. Coleman-Jensen et al. 2015, Gundersen and 
Ziliak 2015). 
There are a number of advantages to using measures of material hardship. First, as 
demonstrated in the goods used to estimate the poverty line in the SPM, the idea of material 
hardship gets to the core of what most people mean by poverty. Rather than relying on income as 
a proxy for the ability to eat, live indoors, and enjoy basic utilities like electricity, heat, and 
water, it is possible to directly inquire about these matters. Secondly, material hardship matches 
closely to the preferred form of safety net delivery in the United States. Rather than giving cash 
directly to the non-elderly poor, the US social safety net is dominated by in-kind assistance like 
Medicaid or near-cash transfers such as food stamps, housing subsidies, and subsidies for 
heating. This is to say nothing of the anti-poverty spending funneled through non-profit entities 
which provide direct services, or the social spending hidden in the tax code (Allard 2009; 
Howard 1997). The United States has a fractured and locally variable safety net aimed at 
delivering goods and services to poor households, not cash. Perhaps then, in addition to measures 
of income poverty, we should attempt to assess the well-being of the population in the very terms 
by which it is conceived of by policy makers: material well-being.  
 
Data and Measures 
Data 
This chapter relies on the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The SIPP 
is a longitudinal survey representative of the non-institutionalized civilian population of the 
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United States. Conducted by the US Census Bureau, the data are freely available to the public 
through the Census Bureau or the National Bureau of Economic Research. Unlike the Panel 
Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID), which shares many of these attributes, the SIPP does not 
follow the same sample over the long term but rather has a series of longitudinal panels of 
varying lengths. Rather than interviewing subjects annually or every two years as in the case of 
the PSID, the SIPP interviews respondents every four months thus enabling researchers to 
investigate sub annual income dynamics. The SIPP was created in the 1970s out of concerns that 
the federal government did not have sufficient data on who used social welfare programs after 
the ramp up in social spending in the 1960s. The SIPP is deliberately designed to capture the 
experiences of lower income Americans and is used extensively in poverty research, often 
producing estimates of poverty, unemployment and the like that are more conservative or lower 
than other nationally representative surveys (Czajka and Denmead 2008). Consequently, the 
analysis in this project should, if anything, underestimate the prevalence of material hardship 
compared to other national surveys.  
The SIPP data used in this chapter and throughout this dissertation is restricted to 
household heads because material hardship is measured at the household level. This is justifiable 
because many types of hardship effect all member of a household simultaneously, such as utility 
shut offs. Households are, by definition, a resource sharing unit (Census Bureau 2014:3-1). Even 
one of the most ardent proponents of the atomistic, rational actor view of humanity, Margaret 
Thatcher, was forced concede this point. Her famous quote about there being no such thing as 
society is often misremembered. The full quote is “There is no such thing [as society]! There are 
individual men and women and there are families[…]”(Thatcher 1987). Individual men and 
women are, according to Thatcher, embedded in resource sharing units.    
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Measuring Material Hardship 
This chapter relies on a pooled sample of all Adult Well-being Topical Modules from the 
1996 Panel to the present. This topical module was fielded five times, in 1998, 2003, 2005, 2010, 
and 2011. The sample is restricted to household heads yielding a sample of N=160,253. All 
analyses are weighted using the appropriate household weight.  
In the past, the sporadic addition of the material hardship questions (usually a component 
of the Adult Well-being Topical Module) limited the type of work that could be done to a few 
cross-sections. Over time, these topical modules have added up and the public now has access to 
seven topical modules between 1992 and 2011, covering both the pre and post-welfare reform 
era as well as two economic downturns (early 2000s recession and the Great Recession).4  
Because material hardship is inherently a multidimensional issue, researchers have 
struggled to find consensus on how best to communicate and summarize the various dimensions 
of material hardship. Three approaches have been used: indexes, scales, and subjective 
evaluation of individual criteria. Indexes are often a simple summation of a set of measured 
material hardships. This approach is widespread but risks ignoring or improperly weighting the 
severity of any particular form of hardship (e.g. the experience of being evicted is likely more 
impactful than having your phone disconnected). To construct scales, some approaches such as 
cluster analysis, correspondence analysis, latent class analysis and factor analysis have also been 
used to identify underlying associations between measures of material hardship. The most 
notable approach to examining an underlying structure of material hardship has been pursued by 
Heflin, Sandberg, and Rafail (2009). These approaches do not entirely eliminate the subjective 
role of the researcher in selecting the criteria used to construct the scale (Ouellette et al. 2004).  
                                                
4 Longitudinal data on material hardship is available in the 2008 panel of the SIPP and is utilized in the second and 
third papers of the dissertation. 
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The way in which I summarize these measures is in the tradition of Mayer and Jencks (1989) 
with a simple, nonweighted index. This approach is fully transparent in that it does not involve 
any subjective judgment calls by the researcher as to which hardships are more impactful and it 
is easily interpretable (eg 0= no hardships, 1=one hardship, 2=two hardships etc).  
There are 9 components to this material hardship index. These components, including the text of 
the questions from the SIPP questionnaire, are listed below5. 
1) Meeting essential expenses 
“During the past 12 months, has there been a time when you did not meet all of 
your essential expenses?” 
2) Paying the full rent or mortgage 
“Was there any time in the past 12 months when you did not pay the full amount 
of the rent or mortgage?” 
3) Eviction 
“In the past 12 months were you evicted from your home or apartment for not 
paying the rent or mortgage?” 
4) Inability to pay gas, oil, or electricity bills 
“How about not paying the full amount of the gas, oil, or electricity bills? Was 
there a time in the past 12 months when that happened to you?” 
5) Gas, oil, or electric utility shutoffs 
“In the past 12 months did the gas or electric company turn off service, or the oil 
company not deliver oil?” 
6) Telephone disconnection due to nonpayment 
“How about the telephone company disconnecting service because payments were 
not made?” 
7) Unmet medical need 
“In the past 12 months was there a time you needed to see a doctor or go to the 
hospital but did not go?” 
8) Unmet dental need 
“In the past 12 months was there a time you needed to see a dentist but did not 
go?” 
 
The final item in the material hardship index is food insecurity. Food security is measured via 
this set of five questions: 
                                                
5 The SIPP questionnaire includes some language in each question that can vary by respondent, such as name, or 
verb conjugation for singular or plural subjects. For the sake of clarity, I have changed all of these to “you” or 
similar.  
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I'm going to read you some statements that people have made about their food situation. 
For these statements, please tell me whether it was OFTEN TRUE, SOMETIMES TRUE, 
or NEVER TRUE for you in the last four months. 
 
1. "The food that I bought just didn't last and I didn't have money to get more." 
Was that often, sometimes or never true for you in the last four months? 
(1) Often true 
(2) Sometimes true 
(3) Never true 
 
2. The next statement is: "You couldn't afford to eat balanced meals." 
Was that often, sometimes or never true for you in the last four months? 
(1) Often true 
(2) Sometimes true 
(3) Never true 
 
 
3. The next questions refer to adults in the household. In the past four months did you 
ever cut the size of your meals or skip meals because there wasn't enough money for 
food? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
 
 
4. In the past four months, did you ever eat less than you felt you should because there 
wasn't enough money to buy food? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
 
 
5. In the past four months, did you ever not eat for a whole day because there wasn't 
enough money for food? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
 
Food insecurity measures have been developed by the US Dept. of Agriculture and are in use 
across a number of major surveys, including the CPS, ACS, and PSID (Coleman-Jensen et al. 
2015). The food insecurity measures in the SIPP are similar to the USDA standardized survey 
questions and have been used to estimate food insecurity (see eg Shaefer and Gutierrez 2013). 
The SIPP food insecurity questions are a shortened version of the full USDA food security 
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measures. A household is coded as experiencing food insecurity if two or more questions are 
answered affirmatively.  
There is some disagreement in the literature on whether or not to include measures of 
fiscal hardship, such as missed bills, in with measures of material hardship. Nelson (2011), for 
example, does not include fiscal hardship arguing that a missed bill is not an actual material 
hardship such as a utility shutoff. In light of recent scholarship examining the consequences of 
living with too little cash (Edin and Shaefer 2015), I do include measures of fiscal hardship. If a 
household is unable to pay rent or utility bills, there is clearly a greater demand for resources 
than the household can meet, and there may be other types of hardship or social isolation not 
captured in the SIPP hardship measures. Furthermore, such inadequate levels of cash puts 
households at risk of falling into debt traps the kind of which have been likened to a new 
sharecropping system (Seefeldt 2017). Even the logic behind the construction of the SPM argues 
that some cash not directly tied to material necessities such as food, clothing, shelter, and utilities 
is necessary. To be unable to pay essential bills shows that not only is a household unable to 
afford food, clothing, shelter, utilities, or some other necessity (such as daycare), but also that the 
twenty percent in unaccounted for cash the SPM factors in is likely long gone as well.  
There are limitations to these measures of material hardship. Some perceive these 
measures as less objective than income measures, that instead of measuring something 
quantifiable like dollars, they are attempting to capture a fundamentally subjective and relative 
understanding of well-being, perhaps even straying so far as to make normative claims about the 
social world. As for the normative claims issue, the entire field of poverty research seems to 
contain an implicit or explicit claim that poverty is, at best, suboptimal. Even Robert Rector, a 
long time critic of anti-poverty efforts, presents an analysis of the standard of living for 
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Americans below the federal poverty line and concludes that the poor are “not living in the lap of 
luxury” (Rector and Sheffield 2011).  Normative concerns over human welfare helped animate 
the first sociologists and social workers, and continue to do so today, but this project sets aside 
this normative concern briefly in order to answer an empirical question: who gets what?   
As for the precision of these measures, the SIPP does present three difficulties. First, as 
Nelson (2011) notes, the types of material hardship measured by the SIPP often impact the entire 
household, not individuals. It is not possible to know how the burden of material hardships is 
distributed within households. Second, the SIPP is limited to the civilian, non-institutionalized 
population thus making any analysis of the material well-being of the institutionalized population 
impossible. This is particularly worrisome given the current policies of mass incarceration. 
Third, while the SIPP deliberately oversamples the poor, the most unstably housed are difficult 
to keep in the sample thus resulting low estimates of some forms of hardship, such as eviction.  
Additional Measures 
 A variety of demographic measures are used in this study. Race and ethnicity variables 
from the SIPP are recoded into 5 categories: non-Hispanic White, non-Hispanic Black, non-
Hispanic Asian, non-Hispanic Other, and Hispanic. The Hispanic group includes respondents 
from any race. The Other group includes multiracial individuals, Native Americans, and any 
others that did not clearly fall into one of the other four categories. Education is broken down 
into less than a high school diploma (including GED), a high school diploma, some college 
(including associate’s degrees), a bachelor’s degree, and more than a bachelors degree (masters, 
professional degrees, or doctorates).  All dollar figures have been adjusted to 2017 dollars using 
the Consumer Price Index.  
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Results 
This section 1) explores the relationship between poverty and material hardship in order to 
understand how much overlap there is in these populations, and then extends the analysis to, 2) 
basic demographics, 3) available resources of income, wealth, credit, and the welfare state and 
concludes with 4) a multinomial logistic regression analysis to explore the independent 
relationships between demographic factors, household resources, and material hardship.  
Poverty and Material Hardship 
Who is poor and who experiences material hardship? These data show that, as suggested 
by earlier work with non-nationally representative samples, there is a difference between income 
poverty and material hardship. Table 2.1 categorizes the pooled sample by OPM poverty status 
and material hardship. As the row and column totals respectively indicate, 14% of the pooled 
sample is poor and the hardship rate, defined as experiencing any the material hardship, is 24%. 
Clearly the hardship rate is higher than the poverty rate, but to what extent do these populations 
overlap? Only about two thirds of households appear to be economically secure, experiencing 
neither OPM poverty nor material hardship. About seven percent of households are poor and do 
not experience hardship and about seven percent of household are poor and do experience 
hardship. Most strikingly, nearly 18% of households experience some form of material hardship 
but are not counted as poor by the OPM – i.e. close to one fifth of the population lives in what I 
call hidden hardship. This is larger than the 13% of households defined as poor by the OPM. For 
every household categorized as poor by the government, an additional 1.29 households 
experience some form of material hardship.  
Households in hidden hardship differ from both economically secure households and 
poor households in a variety of ways. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show poverty and material hardship 
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with column and row totals respectively. The vast majority of those who do not experience 
hardship are also not poor, over 90%, while 10% of households that avoid material hardship are 
income poor. The vast majority of households, 73%, that experience material hardship are also 
not poor. Households that experience material hardship are overwhelmingly in the hidden 
hardship category. Poor households are roughly split evenly between hardship and non-hardship. 
About 20% of non-poor households experience some hardship. Put another way, the hardship 
rate amongst non-poor households (20%) is higher than the official poverty rate (13%), to say 
nothing of the 50% hardship rate among the poor. Only 6.6% of households are both poor and 
experience material hardship. As has been shown in non-nationally representative samples, the 
income poverty and material hardship have some overlap, but not much (Heflin 2006; Mayer and 
Jencks 1989). The populations identified by the poverty line and material hardship measures are 
largely distinct. 
One reasonable response to these findings is that the OPM threshold may simply be set 
too low. Many social safety net programs recognize this issue and use some multiplier of the 
OPM as an eligibility guideline. For example, to be eligible for the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program, a household generally has to be under 130% of the poverty line (Center for 
Budget and Policy Priorities 2016). Table 2.4 shows hardship rates by various fractions of the 
poverty line. Below the poverty line (100% of the poverty line), hardship rates hover near 50%. 
As income rises, hardship rates decline. It is not until the 400%+ category that the hardship rates 
falls below the OPM poverty rate. This is quite high up the income ladder. In 2016, the poverty 
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line for a family of four (two adults and two children) was $24,339 making 400% of the poverty 
line $97,356.6   
How can it be that any household earning nearly six figures struggles to make ends meet? 
Mayer (1993) proposes a simple theoretical model to explain material hardship: when material 
demands exceed available resources, hardship occurs. The SIPP contains data on available 
resources, but the material demands on a household are not directly measured. Since the late 20th 
century, American households are increasingly bearing the brunt of risk as other institutions, 
such as employers and the state, shift risk on to them (Hacker 2006). Perhaps as a consequence 
demands on household resources are more varied than previously imagined.  
It is possible that only examining hardship through a dichotomous variable might be 
obscuring some substantive differences in the type of material or depth of hardship. Table 2.7 
examines both the type and number of hardships reported by households. Of the quarter of 
households that report some hardship, only 35% report one hardship whereas 65% report 
multiple hardships. Of households with only one type of hardship, 75% experience something 
other than difficulty making ends meet, including nearly 30% that report food insecurity. 
Perhaps the “softest” measure of hardship is difficulty meeting essential expenses. One 
could imagine an affluent household understanding a country club membership or housecleaner 
as an “essential expense.” However, households that experience only difficulty meeting essential 
expenses are rare. Of households with material hardship, only 8% report this type of hardship 
alone, whereas 92% report either other hardships or difficulty meeting essential expenses in 
addition to other hardships. What one gains in using a dichotomous variable of hardship is the 
                                                
6Of these relatively high income households that experience material hardship, half of them (5% of total) report 
difficulty meeting essential expenses, compared to 60% of all households with any hardship (14.75% of total). The 
other half of these high income households experience other forms of material hardship.   
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breadth of the population effected at the expense of an understanding of the depth of hardship 
experienced by so many American households.  
The OPM is of particular interest because it is the only poverty measure that actually 
determines one’s eligibility for social safety net programs. Other income-based measures of 
poverty exist, primarily relative measures, and ought to be considered as well. The UK has a 
measure of income poverty set at 60% of the median household income. Table 2.5 shows this 
UK-style poverty threshold cross-tabbed with material hardship. The overall poverty rate with 
this relative measure more than doubled to 30%, but even this more generous definition of 
poverty fails to capture the entire proportion of the population that experiences hardship. With 
the UK-style relative poverty measure, 13% of households still report material hardship but are 
not counted as poor. 
Table 2.6 pushes this logic even further and examines median income. Even using 
median income as a definition of income poverty (to be clear, I am not suggesting that median 
income is a realistic measure of income poverty, this is merely a thought experiment), 7.6% of 
households still fall into the “non-poor” yet experiencing material hardship category. The 
hardship rate above the median is 15%, about on part with the OPM poverty rate for the nation as 
a whole, whereas the hardship rate below the median is 34%. Households above median income 
account for approximately 31% of all households reporting material hardship.  
In Table 2.6, I push the income poverty line far higher than is reasonable because it 
reveals something significant. If it can be agreed that when people think of poverty, they are 
actually concerned with the material well-being of people, that is to say whether or not they can 
afford food, shelter, utilities, medical care, and other necessities, and that social scientists and 
bureaucrats have used income measures as a proxy for these things, then the results in Table 2.6 
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show income is a poor proxy for what is actually meant by the word “poverty.” The problem 
with the OPM is not that it is an imperfect measure of income poverty, the problem is using 
income alone as a proxy for poverty.    
Demography of Poverty and Hardship 
 There are substantive differences across racial/ethnic groups as seen in Table 2.8. 
Households with Black, Hispanic or Other household heads have hidden hardship rates of about 
25% compared to about 15% for White and Asian households. For Whites and Asians, a majority 
of poor households do not experience hardship whereas for Black, Hispanic, and Other 
households a majority of poor households experience some form of material hardship. While the 
absolute numbers are worse for non-Whites and Asians, the ratio of non-poor households with 
material hardship to OPM poor is more lopsided in White and Asian headed households. For 
every white household in OPM poverty, 1.51 experience hardship above the poverty line. This 
ratio is lower in Black households (.99) and Hispanic households (1.05).  If hardship is what we 
really mean by poverty, the OPM appears to do a marginally better job of capturing poverty in 
Black, Hispanic, and Other households than White or Asian households.  
In general, as education increases, poverty and hardship decrease.  Table 2.9 shows that 
the highest poverty and hardship rates are found in household heads with the lowest education. 
Rates of non-poor hardship are nearly double for those with high school diplomas or less 
compared to those with a BA or higher. The proportion of the poor with and without hardship is 
fairly even until educational attainment reaches the BA and BA+ categories at which point 
hardship becomes a minority experience even amongst the poor. As with racial and ethnic 
differences, the ratio of non-poor with material hardship to OPM poor is higher in categories 
generally thought of as more well off. There are 0.7 households in hardship above the poverty 
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line for every household below the poverty line amongst householders with less than a high 
school degree compared to 1.84 for households headed by someone with a bachelor’s degree. 
While the overall rates of hardship and poverty are lower amongst households with greater 
educational attainment, there is ultimately more hidden hardship in these households too.  
Other household characteristics follow this general pattern, such as sex of the household 
head, the presence of children in the household, and senior status, as seen in Table 2.10. In 
general, households with female heads are less economically well off than those with male 
heads. The poverty rate for male-headed households is 10% compared to 17% for female-headed 
households. The hardship rate for male-headed households is also higher, at 21% compared to 
28% for female-headed households. The presence of children under 18 appears to be related with 
reduced levels of economic well-being. Approximately 20% of households with children 
experience hardship but are not categorized as poor, compared to 16% for households without 
children. The overall hardship rate for households with children is 32% (20% poverty rate) 
compared to 21% for households without children (12% poverty rate).  Households headed by 
seniors report non-poor hardship rates ten percentage points lower than younger household 
heads. Strikingly, amongst poor households with seniors only a quarter report hardship compared 
to half of poor households with younger household heads. Of all households reporting hardship, 
only 11% are headed by seniors. The generally low hardship rates amongst seniors may be due to 
the presence of strong universal social safety net programs (a guaranteed income in the form of 
Social Security and single payer health insurance in the form of Medicare), and the accumulation 
of wealth over the lifecourse.   
While measures of the overall poverty and hardship rates are basically as one would 
expect, the ratio of households with hardship above the poverty line to households in poverty for 
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these categories again shows that there is more hidden hardship in traditionally well to do 
categories. The ratio of hidden hardship is higher in male-headed households than female ones, 
higher in households without children than those with children, and higher in households under 
65 than senior headed households. There are two moving parts that can explain this pattern. First, 
is the income poverty rate of these households (generally higher for female headed households) 
and, second, the demands on resources faced by these households (higher for households with 
children, possibly also for prime working age households in general).   
Income, Wealth, Credit, and Other Sources of Support 
If material hardship occurs when the demand for resources exceed the available resources 
of a given household, then it is likely that hardship varies with the main resources household 
have to meet such demands: income, wealth, credit, and the welfare state. While income 
measures of poverty may not be able to explain all of the variance in material hardship rates, they 
are certainly a key factor.  Table 2.11 reports total income, earned income, the coefficient of 
variation for both total and earned income, average welfare transfers, and a decommodification 
measure.  
Total income is highest for the economically secure households that avoid both income 
poverty and hardship and lowest for households in poverty. Between the two, but much closer to 
the economically secure, are households above the poverty line but that do experience material 
hardship, bringing in on average about $59 thousand per year. Earned income, which is to say 
labor market income, is similarly distributed between the four groups.  
Income volatility as measured by the coefficient of variance (see definition and 
discussion in appendix A) differs wildly between the groups. It is lowest amongst the 
economically secure, and highest amongst the poor, particularly the poor who experience 
 26 
hardship. Key mechanisms for mitigating income instability found in the labor market are 
welfare state transfers. The largest average transfers are found amongst the poor who experience 
hardship, as fits with the overall approach of the US welfare state to target those at the bottom.  
The decommodification measure in this table is a measure of the percentage of household 
income that is derived from sources other than labor, such as welfare transfers and returns from 
capital. This way of measuring welfare state strength and exposure to the vagaries of the labor 
market is common in comparative welfare state research (see e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990). In 
general, the poor have the highest decommodification levels, followed by the economically 
secure. The lowest levels of decommodification can be found amongst household in hidden 
hardship. This sense that others to the left of them and to the right are somehow getting more 
help from the government is, on the whole, not entirely inaccurate. 
In addition to support from labor markets and the welfare state, two major resources for 
households are wealth and credit. Table 12 presents poverty and hardship by net worth, total 
debt, unsecured debt, and various debt to income ratios. All dollar figures have been adjusted to 
2017 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. When considering the net worth of households, it 
is most striking that poor households without hardship have a higher average net worth than 
households above the poverty line that experience hardship, about $128,000 to $104,000 
respectively. On average, households in hidden poverty are less wealthy than poor households 
that manage to avoid material hardship. Households in poverty with material hardship have much 
lower average net worth of only $40,000 while economically secure households have an average 
net worth of over $305,000. Wealth, or lack thereof, and hardship go hand in hand. Perhaps 
wealth provides an internal, private social safety net (Pfeffer and Haellsten 2012).  
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As the mid twentieth century post-war economic boom ended in the 1970s, policy makers 
increasingly turned to expanded access to consumer credit to make up for stagnant wages and to 
push off, as far as possible, a political crisis that would accompany a distributional crisis of 
capitalism (Krippner 2011). Poor households have debt to income loads over 100 times that of 
non-poor households ($140 in debt for every dollar of income compared to $1.24). Poor 
households also carry higher levels of unsecured debt, such as credit card debt, as a proportion of 
their total debt load. While the total debt loads of households in hidden hardship resemble 
economically secure households more than poor households, the proportion of unsecured debt to 
the total debt load is similar to poor households. In short, those who are not economically secure 
appear to be using the plastic safety net of consumer credit to avoid, or attempt to avoid, material 
hardship.  
Access to credit is an essential resource for any household. Measuring debt is a way of 
assessing which households have had both access to and the need to access credit in the past. 
Total debt, while interesting, captures “good debt” such as a home mortgage loan. Unsecured 
debt, such as credit card debt, is more likely to be used in consumption smoothing aimed at 
avoiding material hardship. Poor households in general have lower amounts of unsecured debt, 
but much higher unsecured debt to income ratios.  
Regression Results 
 Multinomial logistic regressions for the 4 categorical outcomes of interest 1) hidden 
hardship 2) poverty and hardship 3) poverty without hardship 4) no poverty, no hardship are used 
to understand the relationship between demographic factors, income, wealth, and credit. In all 
regressions, the economically secure group serves – those without poverty or hardship – as the 
base category. Table 2.13 reports the comparison between the economically secure and those in 
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hidden hardship (above the poverty line but experiencing hardship) over 4 models. The first 
model considers only demographic factors, the second model only income measures, the third 
model wealth and debt measures, and the fourth model is a full model including demographics, 
income, and wealth together.  
Because odds and log odds coefficients do not allow comparisons across models (Mood 
2010) , all coefficients reported are average marginal effects (Williams 2012). This section will 
discuss the interpretation of these marginal effects and conclude with an illustrative story to aid 
interpretation.  
The interpretation of average marginal effects for categorical variables is straightforward. 
For example, in model 1, the marginal effect of being Black (compared to White as the reference 
category) when all other demographic factors are controlled for, is .066. That is, holding all other 
demographic covariates constant, black headed households are 6.6 percentage points more likely 
than white headed households to be in the hidden hardship category compared to the 
economically secure category. Interpreting a continuous variable is similar. For example, the 
marginal effect of age in model 1 is .005. This is often casually interpreted as a one unit increase 
in age (in this case, one unit one year) being associated with a .5 percentage point increase the 
predicted chance of being in the hidden hardship group, compared to the economically secure 
group. A more precise interpretation of this marginal effect would be that the probability of 
being in hidden hardship increases with age at a rate such that, if the rate were constant, the 
probability of hidden hardship would increase by 0.5 percentage points if age increased by 1 
year.  
Imagine two families, the Jacksons and the Sullivans, the former black and the later 
white. Based on race alone, the Jacksons have a 22% predicted probability of falling into the 
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hidden hardship group compared to 17% for the white Sullivans . If the Sullivan household head 
went beyond a high school diploma and finished a BA, the chances drops from 18% to 14%. 
With only a high school diploma, the Jacksons would have a 23% chance of entering hidden 
hardship, and a bachelor’s degree would only reduce their predicted probability to 18%--the 
same as the white Sullivan family with only a high school diploma (Figure 2.1). Whatever 
advantage a household can gain by having a household head who finished college is erased by 
race.  
The gap cannot easily be closed by greater income either. If earning only $30 thousand a 
year, the Sullivans have 24% chance of experiencing hidden hardship. At the same income, the 
Jacksons have a 30% chance. Moving up to a $90,000 per year—no small feat by any means—
would reduce the Sullivans’ chance to 18%. The same income gain with the Jacksons would drop 
their probability to 24%, the same as the Sullivans at $30,000 (Figure 2.2).  
Income instability reveals a similar gap (Figure 2.3). I use the coefficient of variation 
(CV) as a measure of income instability. The CV is the standard deviation divided by the mean. 
For example, a household with completely steady income has a CV of zero. A household with 
some substantial variability might have a CV of .5 and a household with extreme variability of 
income might have a CV of 1. For example, a household earning $5000, $0, and $2500 over a 
given three month period would have a CV of 1. With a CV of 1, the Jacksons have a probability 
of experiencing hidden hardship of 32% whereas the Sullivans have only 25%. At a CV of .5, the 
chances drop to .25 and .19 respectively. At a CV of 0—perfectly consistent income—the 
chances drop to .19 and .14 respectively. The racial gap does not close.  
Can wealth explain away some of the racial gap (Figure 2.4)? At a net worth of $100,000, 
the Sullivans have a probability of experiencing hidden hardship of .18 whereas for the Jacksons 
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it is .24. For the Sullivans to have a similar probability, they would need a net worth of negative 
$100,000 (net debt). Such a net debt would simultaneously give the Jacksons a probability of .31. 
Discussion  
 The phenomenon of hidden hardship in the United States suggests a number of next steps 
for future research. First, is a closer examination of the geography of hidden hardship is needed. 
Given the spatially concentrated nature of the social safety net (Allard 2009) and the broad shift 
towards suburban rather than urban poverty (Kneebone and Garr 2010), trying to better 
understand where households in hidden hardship live is a necessary step in determining how best 
to meet the needs of this population.  
 Next steps in a spatial direction also invite questions about the political implications of 
hidden hardship. Does the experience of material hardship lead to any particular type of political 
engagement or non-engagement? Given how geographically sensitive the US political system is, 
is it possible that even a weak relationship between hidden hardship and political engagement 
could have outsized consequences?  
 At least one major unresolved question arises from this finding: how much money is 
enough? The problem of high-income material hardship is an open question in need of further 
study. The notion that households with incomes in the hundreds of thousands of dollars could 
still be facing material hardship the same as those near, and below, the poverty line seems to lack 
a certain face validity. And yet, the survey responses to the material hardship questions are quite 
clear. Further research is needed on the type and duration of hardship faced by higher income 
households, and the ways in which consumptions patterns may intersect with material hardship 
for his subset of the population.   
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 In order to address some of these next steps and unresolved questions, additional data 
may needed to be collected. The SIPP does not ask any questions related to political engagement. 
As a result, scholars may needed to find ways of assessing material hardship using fewer 
measures of hardship (such as food insecurity alone) on other datasets. Furthermore, nearly all of 
the qualitative study of material hardship takes place on samples drawn from explicitly income 
poor or recently income poor households. It is reasonable to suspect that some of the qualitative 
results for middle and upper middle class households may differ considerably.  
Material hardship and income poverty provide different understandings of the well-being 
of US households. While only 14% of households are categorized as poor, 24% experience 
material hardship. Of those in material hardship, 73% are in hidden hardship, meaning their 
income is above the poverty line. Hidden hardship makes up almost 18% of households. The 
existence of this group presents a methodological problem, a policy challenge, and a theoretical 
puzzle.  
 Methodologically, the unidimensional measure of income poverty, while parsimonious, is 
not an adequate measure of poverty. If material hardship is truly at the heart of the concept of 
poverty, then researchers need to move towards a multidimensional approach to the 
measurement of poverty. While income is important, so too is the temporality of income, 
particularly in the form of income instability. The existence of hardship above the poverty line 
demonstrates the risk in relying on a unidimensional measure.  
  The policy challenge presented by hidden hardship strikes at the core logic of the US 
welfare state. As a liberal welfare state, the US has traditionally used targeted, means tested 
programs focused on poverty alleviation at the very bottom of the income ladder (Esping-
Andersen 1990). Over time, anti-poverty efforts have increasingly become hidden in the tax code 
 32 
(Howard 1997; Mettler 2011), and funneled through non-profit organizations (Allard 2009). 
Since 1996, the demise of cash welfare has resulted in the creation of a group of households 
disconnected from both the welfare state and labor market (Danziger 2010) resulting in the 
existence of extreme poverty in the United States (Shaefer and Edin 2013) all the while non-
income based forms of welfare spending continue to rise (Kenworthy 2014).  
 The existence of hidden hardship calls into question the current, exclusive focus on the 
poorest Americans via targeted, means tested social assistance programs. While households 
below the poverty line do have high hardship rates (47%), the bulk of households with hardship 
live above the poverty line (73%). Means-tested programs that depend upon the poverty line as a 
cutoff point will, by definition, fail to assist households in hidden hardship. Furthermore, 
existing social safety net programs are difficult to access in a timely manner (Seefeldt 2017) thus 
making them of little relevance to households with inconsistent incomes that may occasionally 
fall below the poverty line for small periods of time.  
 The social policy problem is intertwined with a theoretical puzzle because poverty, 
broadly defined, is the result of the distribution of power in an advanced capitalist society (Brady 
2009). If the existence of hidden hardship indicates the failure of the consumer-credit fueled 
attempt to avoid the distributional crisis of capitalism (Krippner 2011; Seefeldt 2017), we will be 
confronted with such a crisis again. There are already some qualitative indications of these 
questions surfacing via the politics of resentment and far right political movements (Hochschild 
2016).  
 These questions about the distribution of power are ultimately questions of freedom. 
Which fictional family is better equipped to live the sort of lives they value, the Sullivans or the 
Jacksons?   
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Chapter 2 Tables and Figures 
 
Table 2.1 Poverty and Material Hardship, Row Totals 
 Material hardship  
OPM Poverty No Hardship Hardship Total 
    
Not poor 68.33  17.84  86.17  
(SE) (0.13) (0.10) (0.09) 
Poor 7.24  6.59  13.83  
(SE) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) 
Total 75.57  24.43  100  
 
Table 2.2 Poverty and Material Hardship, Column Totals 
 Material Hardship 
OPM Poverty No Hardship Any Hardship Total 
    
Not Poor 90.42  73.03  86.17  
(SE) (0.09) (0.25) (0.09) 
Poor 9.58  26.97  13.83  
(SE) (0.09) (0.25) (0.09) 
Total % 100  100  100  
 
Table 2.3 Poverty and Material Hardship, Row Totals 
 Material Hardship 
OPM Poverty No Hardship Any Hardship Total 
    
Not Poor 79.30  20.70  100  
(SE) (0.12) (0.12)  
Poor 52.37  47.63  100  
(SE) (0.37) (0.37)  
Total % 75.57  24.43  100  
(SE) (0.12) (0.12)  
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Table 2.4 OPM Ratio and Hardship, Row Totals 
 Material Hardship  
OPM Ratio No Hardship Any hardship  Total 
    
Less than .5 % 51.32  48.68  100  
(SE) (0.58) (0.58)  
.5-1 % 53.09  46.91  100  
(SE) (0.48) (0.48)  
1-1.5 % 62.67  37.33  100  
(SE) (0.42) (0.42)  
1.5-2 % 67.99  32.01  100  
(SE) (0.40) (0.40)  
2-3 % 74.57  25.43  100  
(SE) (0.28) (0.28)  
3-4 % 80.90  19.10  100  
(SE) (0.29) (0.29)  
4+ % 89.12  10.88  100  
(SE) (0.15) (0.15)  
Total % 75.57  24.43  100  
(SE) (0.12) (0.12)  
 
Table 2.5 Relative Poverty and Material Hardship 
 Material Hardship  
Relative Poverty No Hardship Any Hardship Total 
    
Not Poor 56.52  13.02  69.53  
(SE) (0.14) (0.09) (0.13) 
Poor 19.06  11.41  30.47  
(SE) (0.11) (0.09) (0.13) 
Total % 75.57  24.43  100  
(SE) (0.12) (0.12)  
 
Table 2.6 Material Hardship and Median Income 
 Material Hardship 
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Above Median 
No Hardship Any Hardship Total 
SE 
42.40  7.60  50.01  
Below Median 
(0.13) (0.07) (0.14) 
SE 
33.17  16.82  49.99  
Total 
(0.13) (0.10) (0.14) 
SE 
75.57  24.43  100  
 
Table 2.7 Hardship Count by Type of Material Hardship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Hardship Count 
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Table 2.8 Poverty and Hardship by Race and Ethnicity 
Race and Ethnicity 
Hardship and Poverty White Black Asian Other Hispanic 
(any race) 
Total 
Hidden Hardship 15.72  25.13  13.08  26.11  23.89  17.84  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Hardship          
Total % of 
population 
8.61  5.55  4.04  2.78  1.85  1.01  0.43  0.13  0.03  
(SE) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 0.00  
If Any hardship 35.27  22.73  16.52  11.37  7.57  4.12  1.76  0.55  0.11  
(SE) (0.26) (0.23) (0.20) (0.18) (0.15) (0.11) (0.09) (0.04) (0.02) 
 Types of 
Hardship 
              
Difficulty Meeting 
Essential Expenses 
24.75  60.58  82.41  92.64  96.62  98.22  98.80  98.95  100  
(SE) (0.40) (0.57) (0.51) (0.43) (0.37) (0.37) (0.49) (0.68) 0.00  
          
Missed rent or 
mortgage payment 
3.41  19.34  34.91  48.82  61.67  78.71  92.28  100  100  
(SE) (0.18) (0.46) (0.65) (0.83) (0.97) (1.09) (1.06) 0.00  0.00  
                    
Evicted 0.00  0.10  0.89  1.81  3.62  6.26  14.17  28.39  100  
(SE) 0.00  (0.03) (0.13) (0.22) (0.38) (0.64) (1.69) (3.57) 0.00  
          
Missed utility bill 8.43  31.96  54.63  70.85  83.24  94.32  98.45  100  100  
(SE) (0.26) (0.54) (0.67) (0.74) (0.75) (0.61) (0.64) 0.00  0.00  
                    
Utilities cut off due 
to nonpayment 
0.00  0.76  4.80  11.06  19.57  31.26  56.55  94.70  100  
(SE) 0.00  (0.10) (0.31) (0.51) (0.79) (1.27) (2.39) (1.60) 0.00  
          
Phone cut off due 
to nonpayment 
3.40  7.30  15.88  27.70  40.71  54.77  83.07  92.52  100  
(SE) (0.17) (0.30) (0.49) (0.74) (0.99) (1.35) (1.60) (1.96) 0.00  
                    
Unable to see a 
doctor 
10.80  26.70  29.09  40.69  57.98  74.66  81.91  98.53  100  
(SE) (0.29) (0.51) (0.61) (0.81) (1.00) (1.19) (2.79) (0.93) 0.00  
          
Unable to see a 
dentist 
19.87  31.23  34.84  49.12  64.74  78.40  87.02  93.32  100  
(SE) (0.36) (0.54) (0.64) (0.83) (0.97) (1.15) (1.62) (2.43) 0.00  
                    
Food Insecurity 29.34  22.03  42.56  57.32  71.85  83.39  87.75  93.58  100  
(SE) (0.42) (0.47) (0.67) (0.82) (0.90) (1.00) (1.46) (2.03) 0.00  
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(SE) (0.11) (0.35) (0.52) (0.79) (0.39) (0.10) 
Down-and-Out 4.37  14.63  4.31  12.99  12.16  6.59  
(SE) (0.06) (0.28) (0.31) (0.59) (0.30) (0.07) 
Getting By 6.07  10.73  9.49  7.69  10.61  7.24  
(SE) (0.08) (0.24) (0.46) (0.47) (0.28) (0.07) 
Economically Secure 73.84  49.51  73.12  53.21  53.34  68.33  
(SE) (0.14) (0.40) (0.69) (0.90) (0.46) (0.13) 
Total % 100  100  100  100  100  100  
Total poor 10.44  25.36  13.80  20.68  22.77  13.83  
(SE) (0.10) (0.35) (0.53) (0.71) (0.38) (0.09) 
Total any hardship 20.09  39.76  17.39  39.10  36.05  24.43  
(SE) (0.13) (0.39) (0.58) (0.88) (0.44) (0.12) 
Ratio of non-poor with material 
hardship to OPM poor: 
1.51  0.99  0.95  1.26  1.05  1.29  
 
Table 2.9 Poverty and Material Hardship by Education 
Education 
Hardship and Poverty Less 
than 
HS 
HS Some 
college 
BA BA+ Total 
Hidden Hardship 20.63  19.92  20.64  12.47  9.15  17.84  
(SE) (0.30) (0.21) (0.19) (0.22) (0.25) (0.10) 
Down-and-Out 14.57  7.79  6.44  2.23  1.30  6.59  
(SE) (0.26) (0.14) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.07) 
Getting By 14.74  7.78  6.31  4.54  3.95  7.24  
(SE) (0.26) (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.17) (0.07) 
Economically Secure 50.06  64.52  66.61  80.75  85.60  68.33  
(SE) (0.37) (0.26) (0.23) (0.26) (0.31) (0.13) 
Total % 100  100  100  100  100  100  
Total poor 29.31  15.56  12.75  6.77  5.25  13.83  
(SE) (0.33) (0.19) (0.16) (0.17) (0.20) (0.09) 
Total any hardship 35.20  27.71  27.08  14.71  10.45  24.43  
(SE) (0.35) (0.24) (0.21) (0.23) (0.27) (0.12) 
Ratio of non-poor with material hardship to 
OPM poor: 
0.70  1.28  1.62  1.84  1.74  1.29  
 
Table 2.10 Poverty, Hardship, and Household Characteristics 
Hardship and Poverty Sex of 
Household Head 
Children under 18 in 
Household 
Age of Household 
Head 
 Male Female No Children Under 65 65+ 
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Children  
Hidden Hardship 16.50  19.14  16.23  20.79  19.95  9.93  
(SE) (0.15) (0.15) (0.12) (0.26) (0.12) (0.16) 
Down-and-Out 4.67  8.47  5.18  11.23  7.58  2.87  
(SE) (0.08) (0.11) (0.07) (0.20) (0.08) (0.09) 
Getting By 5.67  8.78  7.13  8.39  6.98  8.22  
(SE) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.18) (0.08) (0.15) 
Economically Secure 73.16  63.61  71.46  59.58  65.48  78.98  
(SE) (0.18) (0.18) (0.15) (0.31) (0.15) (0.22) 
Total % 100  100  100  100  100  100  
Total poor 10.34  17.24  12.31  19.63  14.56  11.09  
(SE) (0.12) (0.14) (0.11) (0.25) (0.11) (0.17) 
Total any hardship 21.17  27.61  21.41  32.02  27.54  12.80  
(SE) (0.16) (0.17) (0.13) (0.30) (0.14) (0.18) 
Ratio of non-poor with 
material hardship to OPM 
poor: 
1.60  1.11  1.32  1.06  1.37  0.90  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.11 Hardship, Poverty, and Household Resources 
 Hidden 
Hardship 
Down-and-
Out 
Getting By Economically 
Secure 
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Total income 58849.24 10227.08 9320.61 84763.36 
(SE) (377.82) (96.48) (85.85) (284.94) 
Earned income 49030.92  5046.91  4200.60  69679.68  
(SE) (375.60) (96.60) (85.50) (295.06) 
CV of Total Income 0.29  0.53  0.50  0.22  
(SE) 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
CV of Earned Income 0.41  0.87  0.82  0.32  
(SE) 0.00  (0.01) (0.01) 0.00  
Welfare Transfers 6358.33  8038.97  6378.48  6826.01  
(SE) (76.99) (106.64) (93.09) (40.81) 
Decommodification 0.25  0.61  0.67  0.30  
(SE) 0.00  (0.01) (0.01) 0.00  
Net Worth  $104,032.86   $41,552.42   $128,263.81   $307,608.88  
 (3170.35) (1641.49) (3525.94) (3993.89) 
Total Debt  $76,610.92   $29,160.02   $40,599.90   $98,889.12  
 (912.59) (838.27) (983.17) (475.52) 
Unsecured Debt  $12,484.52   $6,800.28   $5,311.88   $9,713.80  
 (388.76) (258.32) (205.93) (128.57) 
Total Debt to Income 
Ratio 1.34  84.32  189.44  1.22  
 (0.02) (10.70) (17.00) (0.01) 
Unsecured Debt to 
Income Ratio 0.24  20.11  33.19  0.13  
 (0.01) (2.50) (7.45) 0.00  
Unsecured Debt to Total 
Debt 0.39  0.56  0.41  0.28  
 0.00  (0.01) (0.01) 0.00  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.12 Hardship, Poverty, and Life Events 
Poverty and Hardship Gap in health 
insurance 
Recent Divorce Recent spell of 
Unemployment 
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coverage 
 No  Yes No Yes No Yes 
Hidden Hardship 15.14  30.29  17.01  19.50  18.91  15.97  
(SE) (0.11) (0.31) (0.13) (0.19) (0.14) (0.16) 
Down-and-Out 4.23  17.48  5.74  8.29  3.66  11.70  
(SE) (0.06) (0.25) (0.08) (0.13) (0.06) (0.14) 
Getting By 6.07  12.65  6.74  8.25  4.31  12.36  
(SE) (0.07) (0.22) (0.08) (0.13) (0.07) (0.15) 
Economically Secure 74.55  39.58  70.51  63.96  73.12  59.97  
(SE) (0.13) (0.33) (0.15) (0.22) (0.15) (0.22) 
Total % 100  100  100  100  100  100  
(SE) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Poor total 10.30  30.13  12.48  16.54  7.97  24.06  
(SE) (0.09) (0.31) (0.11) (0.18) (0.09) (0.19) 
Any Hardship 19.37  47.76  22.75  27.79  22.57  27.68  
(SE) (0.12) (0.33) (0.14) (0.21) (0.14) (0.20) 
Ratio of non-poor with 
material hardship to 
OPM poor: 
1.47  1.01  1.36  1.18  2.37  0.66  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.7 Selected Estimates from Multinomial Logistic Regressions 
 
                                    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
                                    b/se b/se b/se b/se 
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Race White 0 
  
0  
 
                                    .
  
. 
 
Black 0.066*** 
  
0.051*** 
 
                                    0.004 
  
0.003 
 
Asian -0.021*** 
  
-0.022*** 
 
                                    0.006 
  
0.006 
 
Other 0.079*** 
  
0.070*** 
 
                                    0.008 
  
0.007 
 
Hispanic 0.039*** 
  
0.020*** 
 
                                    0.004 
  
0.004 
Gender Male 0 
  
0 
 
                                    .
  
. 
 
Female 0.026*** 
  
0.032*** 
 
                                    0.002 
  
0.002 
Education Less than HS 0 
  
0 
 
                                    .
  
. 
 
HS -0.019*** 
  
-0.024*** 
 
                                    0.004 
  
0.004 
 
Some College -0.023*** 
  
-0.021*** 
 
                                    0.004 
  
0.004 
 
BA -0.099*** 
  
-0.070*** 
 
                                    0.004 
  
0.004 
 
BA+ -0.125*** 
 
 -0.082*** 
 
                                    0.004 
  
0.005 
 
Age 0.005*** 
  
0.010*** 
 
                                    0
  
0 
Age Age Squared -0.000*** 
  
-0.000*** 
 
                                    0
  
0 
 
Number of Kids -0.002* 
  
-0.002 
 
                                    0.001 
  
0.001 
Income Welfare State Transfers -0.001*** 
 
0.002*** 
                                                                  0 
 
0 
 
Income 
 
0.002*** 
 
0.003*** 
                                                                  0 
 
0 
 
Income Instability 0.124*** 
 
0.104*** 
   
0.004 
 
0.004 
Wealth Net worth 
  
-0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
                                    
 
0 0 
 
Unsecured Debt 
 
0.000*** 0.000*** 
   
 0 0 
 
N                                   160253 156058 160253 156058 
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Figure 2.1 Predicted Probability of Experiencing Hidden Hardship by Race and Education 
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Figure 2.2 Predicted Probability of Experiencing Hidden Hardship by Race and Income 
 
Figure 2.3 Predicted Probability of Hidden Hardship by Race and CV of Income 
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Figure 2.4 Predicted Probability of Hidden Hardship by Race and Wealth 
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Chapter 3 How the Other Half Still Lives: Duration of Hardship 
 
Introduction 
 Do households move in and out of a spell of material hardship, or is material hardship 
more of a chronic state? These questions are examined in this chapter using the only repeated 
measures of material hardship in the SIPP. I find that the duration of hardship is unevenly 
distributed across the population, with non-white households having much higher rates of 
hardship over time than white households. The risk of experiencing chronic hardship is likewise 
highly dependent upon race, such that (conditioned on income) white households with a net 
worth of $0 have the same risk of experiencing chronic hardship as a black household with a net 
worth of $150,000.  
Previous Literature 
 Poverty research using longitudinal survey data has long revealed that poverty is not a 
static state, as often thought. Rather, households move in and out of poverty over time (Iceland 
2003). The percent of households in persistent poverty, defined as incomes below the poverty 
line in 8 out of 10 years, is vanishingly small, less than two percent (Duncan 1984).  Conversely, 
the percentage of individuals that experience income poverty at some point in the life course has 
been estimated to be as high as fifty percent (Rank 2005).  
Income poverty and material hardship share an underlying logic. Income poverty occurs 
with a particular resource—income—falls below an arbitrary line. Material hardship occurs 
when all available resources to a household (income, wealth, transfers, credit, informal 
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assistance) fail to meet the demands on those resources (Mayer, 1993). Most of what is known 
about material hardship is based on cross section, point in time estimates (Bauman 1999; Beverly 
2001; Iceland and Bauman 2007). Over time, Heflin (2017) shows that long term recent trends in 
material hardship, roughly 1993-2011, loosely map on to what is known about trends in poverty. 
After some improvement in material well-being circa 1998-2005, hardship rates increased again 
in the wake of the great recession and exceed their early 1990s high.  
Until recently, non-nationally representative samples such as the Women’s Employment 
Survey have been the only data available to examine movement in to and out of a spell of 
hardship. Research in this are has shown that poor women were more likely to experience 
chronic hardship than chronic income poverty (Heflin and Butler 2013).  The only nationally 
representative sample to include multiple measures of material hardship is the 2008 panel of the 
SIPP. A recent paper examining the dynamics of hardship using the SIPP (Heflin 2017) 
examines spells of hardship across four domains of hardship (food hardship, housing hardship, 
medical hardship, and essential expense hardship. She finds that “experiences of material 
hardship are not concentrated among one group repeatedly but are highly dynamic and spread 
over the wider population” (p. 528) and as a result, cross sectional approaches underestimate the 
experience of material hardship. While she finds some statistically significant differences by 
race, the results presented here go into more detail and show that that the experience of material 
hardship is both widely distributed across the population and disproportionally borne by non-
white households.  
Data and Methods 
 This chapter uses data from the 2008 Panel of the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP), a longitudinal survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau that is 
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nationally representative of the civilian, non-institutionalized population. Questions regarding 
material hardship are found on the Adult Well-being Topical Module (AWTM). Previous panels 
of the SIPP only fielded the AWTM once, limiting the amount of longitudinal work that could be 
done on material hardship. The 2008 Panel is the first, and to date only, nationally representative 
survey to include multiple measures of material hardship.  
The AWTM was fielded in Wave 6 and Wave 9, during the summers of 2010 and 2011 
respectively, approximately one year apart. Unlike Chapter 2 which averages across years, the 
results in this chapter are generated by data gathered in more specific period of time. In general, 
material hardship rates increased in 2010 and 2011 in aftermath of the Great Recession. See 
Appendix B for more detailed information about material hardship time trends.  
 In order examine the duration of hardship, I first use descriptive statistics to examine the 
duration of both hardship and poverty in the sample. Later, I use predicted probabilities to report 
the results of multinomial logistic regressions modeling the duration of material hardship and 
poverty. The model for these regressions includes 1) demographic factors including race, age, 
age squared, sex, marital status, number of children under 18 in the household,; 2) household 
resources including household income, net worth, and unsecured debt, income instability, and 
welfare state transfers. The outcome variables for these models are either 1) duration of poverty 
or 2) duration of material hardship.  
 
Results 
 The previous chapter argues that income poverty and material hardship are distinct 
concepts with surprisingly little overlap in the population as a whole. Building on this insight, 
Table 3.1 is a cross tabulation of duration of hardship and duration of poverty. Hardship here 
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means reporting any of the nine types of hardship specified in Chapter 2. No hardship means no 
hardship at either time point, episodic hardship means hardship at one time point but not both, 
and chronic hardship is defined as hardship at both time points. Similarly, no poverty means no 
income poverty at either time points, episodic poverty means income poverty at one but not both 
points in time, and chronic poverty is defined as income poverty at both time points.  
 Hardship is more prevalent than income poverty. Only 64% of households avoid hardship 
compared to 80% of households that avoid income poverty. Over 21% of households report 
episodic hardship compared to 11% of households reporting episodic poverty, while 15% of 
households report chronic hardship compared to 9% of households that report chronic poverty. 
When length of spells are taken into account, it is clearer that hardship is almost a normative 
experience for American households.  
 It is maybe hard to shake one’s assumptions about a close relationship between income 
poverty and material hardship. Empirically, this is not the case. In order to further illustrate this 
counterintuitive finding, two pie charts have been generated. Figure 3.1 examines duration of 
poverty and breaks out the proportion of households that experience some sort of hardship. 63% 
of households never experience income poverty while 16% of households never experience 
income poverty but do experience hardship at one or both time points. About half of households 
that experience either episodic poverty or chronic poverty report some sort of hardship. Figure 
3.2 reports household by duration of hardship and the experience of any duration of income 
poverty. Households that report poverty appear to be roughly split nearly equal thirds of chronic, 
episodic, and no hardship. It is worth nothing that overall, about 80% of households reporting 
either chronic or episodic hardship are in hidden hardship. For the population as a whole, 18% 
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experience episodic hidden hardship and 8% experience chronic hidden hardship. To talk about 
the temporal depth of hardship is usually to be talking about hidden hardship. 
 Perhaps the most striking aspect of this figure is the proportion of households that report 
either hardship and/or poverty at one or both time points. Only 56% of households are 
economically secure across the entire two years. On the other extreme, only 3% of households 
report chronic hardship and concurrent chronic poverty. 41% of households then exist in an 
intermediate zone, either in hidden hardship or getting by, somewhere between economic 
security and being chronically down and out. This finding invites the return of an old question: 
how does the other half live? But first, who exactly is in this other half?  
 
 Hidden Hardship 
 The majority of households that experience hardship are in hidden hardship (Table 3.2). 
Of those in episodic hardship, 80% are in episodic hidden hardship. Of those households in 
chronic hardship, 60% are in chronic hidden hardship, 20% are in hidden hardship at least at one 
time point, and another 20% are below the poverty line at both points in time. Overall, 27% of all 
households are in either episodic material hardship or chronic hidden hardship.  
 
Race and Ethnicity 
 There are notable differences in the duration of spells of hardship and poverty by race 
and ethnicity. Table 3.3 reports these findings with column totals while Table 3.4 reports them 
with row totals. Despite making up about 70% of households, white households account for 75% 
of non-poor households and 77% of non-hardship households (Table 3.3). 85% of white 
households avoid poverty while 69% avoid material hardship (Table 3.4). While whites are 
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underrepresented both categories of poverty and hardship, they still make up the majority of 
households in either category of hardship of poverty. Among White households only, 9% 
experience episodic poverty while 6% experience chronic poverty, and 19% of white households 
report episodic hardship while 11% report chronic hardship. In other words, whites are 1.4 times 
more likely to experience episodic poverty than chronic poverty and 1.8 times more likely to 
experience episodic hardship than chronic hardship. On the whole, Asian-American households 
are very similar to White households, with 80% and 71% of households avoiding poverty or 
hardship respectively. In terms of the duration of poverty and hardship, episodic poverty is 1.2 
times more common than chronic poverty and episodic hardship is 2.3 times more common than 
chronic hardship for Asian households. Both White households and Asian-American households 
enjoy relatively low rates of poverty or hardship, and are more likely to have episodic spells of 
poverty or hardship than chronic poverty or hardship.  
 Black households are in many ways a mirror image of White and Asian households. 
Despite being 12% of the population, Black households account for only 10% of households that 
avoid poverty and 9% of households that avoid hardship. In contrast, they make up 24% of 
households in chronic poverty and 20% of households in chronic hardship. Amongst Black 
households, 68% avoid poverty while only 47% avoid hardship. Chronic poverty is more 
common for these households than episodic poverty, and episodic hardship is only 1.3 times 
more likely than chronic hardship.  Other households (largely Native American) report similar 
rates and duration of poverty and hardship as Black households. Hispanic households have rates 
of poverty and hardship nearly identical to Black households.  
 
Education 
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 In general, the greater a household head’s educational attainment the less likely the 
household is to experience material hardship or income poverty. Table 3.5 reports the duration of 
hardship and poverty with column totals, while Table 3.6 reports the same by row totals. Despite 
accounting for only 10% of households, those with less than a high school diploma make up 16% 
of those in episodic poverty, 28% of those in chronic poverty, 13% of those in episodic hardship, 
and 17% of those in chronic hardship. Only 60% of households with a head who has less than a 
high school diploma avoid poverty, and 49% avoid hardship. Chronic poverty is more likely than 
episodic poverty for this group while episodic hardship is more common than chronic hardship.  
 Households in which the head has a high school diploma fare better than households with 
a head who has less than a high school diploma. Rates and duration of poverty and hardship are 
all roughly similar to the proportion of such households in the population—24%. Amongst these 
households, 77% avoid poverty while only 58% avoid hardship. Episodic poverty and episodic 
hardship are more common than their chronic counterparts. Similar in many ways to this group 
are households headed by someone with some college education, but not a BA. This is the largest 
group of households by education—35% of all households—and also makes up the largest group 
in any of the poverty or hardship categories. Fully 40% of households in chronic poverty have a 
household head with only some college. Within this educational group, 80% avoid poverty while 
60% avoid hardship. Episodic poverty or hardship is more common than the chronic 
counterparts.  
 Households with a head who has obtained a bachelor’s degree do markedly better than 
the above households. Despite accounting for 19% of the population, these households make up 
only 8% of those in chronic poverty and 20% of those in chronic hardship. Amongst BA headed 
households, 89% do not experience poverty and 76% do not experience hardship. Only 7% 
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experience episodic poverty, and 17% experience episodic hardship, which chronic variations at 
4% and 7% respectively. Households with a head who has more than a bachelor’s degree are 
even less likely to experience poverty or hardship regardless of duration, but in general have 
rates that are slightly lower than BA only households. The relationship between education and 
the duration of poverty and hardship spells appears to form three clusters: less than high school, 
high school and some college, BA and more than a BA.  
 
Household Type 
 Households can be thought of as existing in three distinct phases in the life cycle: 1) 
prime working age, defined as a household head between 18 and 65, with children under 18 in 
the home, 2) prime working age without children under 18 in the home, and 3) seniors, defined 
as having a household head over 65 years old, Tables 3.7 and 3.8 report the breakdown of 
duration of poverty and hardship by household type.  
 Seniors largely avoid hardship and poverty. 88% of seniors do not report poverty and 
79% do not report hardship. 6 percent of seniors experience episodic poverty and another 6% 
experience chronic poverty. 16% report episodic hardship while only 6% report chronic 
hardship. Small poverty and hardship rates could largely be due to stable and secure incomes in 
the form of Old Age Insurance and private pensions, a lifetime of wealth accumulation, 
guaranteed health insurance via Medicare, and fewer expenses such as mortgages or childcare.  
 Household headed by someone in prime working age without kids fare noticeably worse 
than seniors. This type of household accounts for 48% of households, but 20% experience either 
episodic or chronic poverty. Only 62% avoid material hardship. Prime working age households 
with kids are in even more dire straits. Only 73% avoid poverty while 56% avoid material 
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hardship. Over a quarter report episodic hardship and 18% report chronic hardship. Prime 
working age households with children account for roughly half of all households in episodic 
poverty, episodic hardship, or chronic hardship.  
 
Household Resources: Income, Wealth, and Credit  
 The relationship between income poverty and material hardship, and the resources 
available to a household differ in their underlying logic. A measure of income poverty such as 
the Official Poverty Measure only takes into account income while ignoring wealth, credit, and 
household expenses. The Supplemental Poverty Measures improves on this approach by 
indexing the poverty line to the cost of a one-size-fits-all basket of necessities and taking into 
account social safety net assistance. Material hardship measures ultimately look at the breaking 
point between available resources for a household and the demands on those resources. No 
assumptions are made about the demands on those resources or the resources themselves. The 
only assumptions made with the material hardship perspective are that things like eviction, food 
insecurity, and utility shut offs would be avoided if possible. In other words, the core 
assumption, and indeed this is very much an assumption, is that no reasonable person choses to 
live in material hardship. Even religious figures, such as monks, who take vows of poverty do 
not live in material hardship (Martin 2011).  
 Table 3.9 reports the mean levels of various types of household resources (averaged over 
two years) by duration of hardship and poverty. Households in poverty have, by definition, the 
lowest mean incomes. Households in episodic hardship have a mean income of $52,000 while 
those in chronic hardship have a mean income of $39,000. Both of these mean incomes are 
considerably above the OPM, over 200% of OPM and 160% of OPM (for a family of four), 
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respectively. Instability of income, as measured by the coefficient of variance, follows a similar 
pattern. Households that avoid poverty or hardship also have the most stable incomes. Household 
in poverty have the most income volatility while those with material hardship report moderate 
income volatility.  
Wealth measures are perhaps a bit more comparable than income measures because the 
categories themselves are not defined by wealth. Households avoiding poverty and hardship have 
the highest net worth, at $248,000 and $274,000 respectively. Households in episodic poverty 
and episodic hardship have lower net worth at $104,000 and $59,148 respectively. Households in 
chronic poverty have a higher net worth, $59,000, than households in chronic hardship at 
$55,000.  
 Unsecured debt tells a different story than income or wealth. Households without poverty 
and hardship have relatively similar levels of unsecured debt, at $8,000 and $7,000 respectively. 
However, for households in some spell of poverty the unsecured debt level decreases. 
Households in episodic poverty have on average $8,000 of unsecured debt while those in chronic 
poverty have only $4,000. In contrast, households in hardship have greater levels of unsecured 
debt. Households with episodic hardship have on average $9,000 in unsecured debt while 
households in chronic hardship have $10,000—the highest of any group.  
 Decommodification rates measure the share of income that is not dependent upon 
household members commodifying their labor. The lower the decommodification rate, the more 
dependent a household income is on paid labor, and less on social safety net support, wealth, or 
other sources of income. Two figures are reported in Table 3.8: first, a figure with the entire 
population; and second, a figure restricting the observations to household heads under 65 years 
old. This is done because seniors, by virtue of low working rates, Social Security, and a lifetime 
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of accumulated wealth, have high decommodification rates. Decommodification rates for 
households with a head under 65 are about .15 for the non-poor and .17 for the non-hardship. 
Households in episodic poverty have a decommodifaction rate of about 0.37, and those in 
chronic poverty have a rate of .57. This signals that indeed, the means-tested welfare state does 
indeed target the income poor. In contrast, households in general experiencing episodic hardship 
have a decommodifcation rate of .24 and those in chronic hardship have a rate of .33. Household 
experiencing hardship are more dependent upon the labor market alone for their income.  
  
Regression Results 
 In order to more fully understand the relationships between these variables, I employ 
multinomial logistic regressions. Model 1 uses the trivariate outcome of no hardship, episodic 
hardship, and chronic hardship. Model 2 uses the trivarite outcome of no poverty, episodic 
poverty, and chronic poverty. Models 1 and 2 have the same conditioning variables consisting of 
demographic measures (race, education, sex, age, age squared, number of children in the 
household, and marital status), income measures (total household income, welfare state 
transfers), and wealth (net worth, unsecured debt). For a fuller description of how these variables 
are constructed, see Chapter 2.  
  Education and Race 
 Similar to the findings in Chapter 2 the most dramatic findings have to do with race. 
Figure 3.3 reports the predicted probabilities of the duration of hardship and poverty spells by 
race. To be clear, these predicted probabilities are based on Models 1 and 2 which control for 
key factors such as income and wealth. Similar to the descriptive statistics, the predicted 
probabilities of various forms of hardship and poverty are similar for White and Asian 
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households who do well, and Black, Other, and Hispanic households who face higher risks. The 
probability of episodic poverty, chronic poverty, and chronic hardship for white households is 
below anything experienced by Black, Other, and Hispanic households. White household 
probability of episodic hardship is similar to that of chronic hardship for the less advantaged 
households.  
 While the predicted probabilities of spells of poverty and hardship by education (see 
Figure 3.4) are similar to the descriptive statistics, the interaction of education and race reveals 
some additional differences (Figure 3.5). The probability of episodic hardship, episodic poverty, 
and chronic poverty for households with a White head who has less than a high school diploma 
are statistically indistinguishable from a household with a Black head who has a bachelor’s 
degree. Chronic hardship is equivalent for White headed households with a high school diploma 
and Black headed households with a BA, controlling for other observables such as income. On 
the other hand, there is also no difference between White headed households with a BA and 
Black headed households with a BA in terms of episodic poverty, chronic hardship, and chronic 
poverty. The notable difference here is in episodic hardship. 
 
Income 
 Income is a key, if not the key, resource households depend upon in order to meet their 
material needs. Income here is mean household income (from all sources) from wave 6 to wave 
9. Figure 3.6 shows the predicted probability of experiencing material hardship or poverty by 
income. The probabilities of experiencing chronic poverty or episodic poverty quickly decline as 
income rises, eventually approaching zero just above $30,000 in household income for chronic 
 57 
poverty and $100,000 for episodic poverty. Chronic hardship declines to about zero nearer to 
$200,000. Episodic hardship appears to be more resistant, and falls only slightly as income rises.  
 Looking at income in isolation conceals variation by race. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 report the 
predicted probabilities of hardship and poverty, respectively, by income over race (white and 
black only). Black chronic and episodic hardships are at much higher rates than whites at every 
point along the income ladder. As with the general population in Figure 3.6, the lines for 
episodic hardship decline only slightly as income increases.  Chronic hardship, on the other 
hand, falls more rapidly as income increases. However, the predicted probabilities are so far 
apart for the two races that the predicted probability of chronic hardship for white households 
with zero income is about .17. To have the same predicted probability of chronic hardship, a 
black household needs to have a household income somewhere between $70,000 and $80,000.  
At no point below household incomes of $200,000 does black episodic hardship begin to 
resemble white episodic hardship. In contrast, predicted probabilities of the duration of a spell of 
poverty by income over race, seen in Figure 3.8, show no meaningful differences by race. This is 
expected because the outcome in question, income poverty, is measured by the key dependent 
variable itself—income.  
 Wealth, as measured in household net worth, is another key resource that households can 
rely on in order to meet their material needs. Spells of poverty appear to have little relationship 
to household income. Again, this is largely definitional. Income poverty is utterly agnostic to 
issue of wealth, debt, and credit. Hardship, on the other hand, is rather responsive to wealth. The 
predicted probabilities of chronic hardship decline rapidly as net worth increases. Episodic 
hardship, as with income, declines more modestly as household net worth increases.  
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 As with income, significant racial disparities by wealth are masked when looking at the 
population as a whole. Figure 3.10 reports the predicted probabilities of chronic and episodic 
over net worth by White and Black households. Episodic hardship, as in the population as a 
whole, declines minimally for both races as wealth increases. Chronic hardship, on the other 
hand, declines more directly as net worth increases. However, the stark disparities by race means 
that the white household with a net worth of  $0 has the same predicted probability of chronic 
material hardship as a black household with a net worth of $175,000.  Figure 3.11 reports the 
same breakdown by race and wealth for durations of poverty, however there does not appear to 
be much relationship between wealth and poverty by race.  
 
Discussion 
There are some important limitations to these results. First, while the SIPP is a nationally 
representative sample, it is only representative of the non-institutionalized, civilian population. 
Policies of mass incarceration over the past several decades has lead to a situation in which a 
sizable percentage of the population is imprisoned and thus missed by the SIPP (Western 2006). 
It is not known how many prisoners or detainees experience material hardship. Similarly, the 
SIPP does not collect information about the material well-being of those in military service.  
While the 2008 panel of the SIPP does contain the only repeated measures of material 
hardship in a longitudinal survey, the fact that hardship is only measured at two points in time 
introduces the problem of both left and right censoring. We simply do not know how long these 
spells of material hardship last, or if we are observing their beginning, end, or some middle 
fluctuation.  
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 Next steps in research on the duration of material hardship require new data collection. 
Because the SIPP only measures material hardship repeatedly in the 2008 panel, and the SIPP is 
the only nationally representative survey that regularly fields the full suite of material hardship 
questions, there may not be much more that can be done directly on the question of the duration 
of material hardship as it currently stands. Perhaps some creative triangulation of existing survey 
data is in order.  
 The main unresolved questions that these findings present are temporal ones. To what 
extent does the fact that these data were collected in 2010 and 2011 make them less generalizable 
to the turn of the millennium United States as a whole?  Given the problems of left and right 
censoring, just how much do these current estimates underestimate the experience of material 
hardship in the United States? If 36% of households experience material hardship over a two-
year period, just how many may experience material hardship in a five-year period? What 
percentage of children experience material hardship before they turn 18?  
Cross sectional approaches to material hardship have masked the true extent of this social 
problem. Looking over two points in time, 36% of households experience material hardship at 
one or both points in time, far more than the 20% which experience income poverty at one or 
both points in time. Like income poverty, households appear to move in and out of material 
hardship with some frequency. In general, as the duration of material hardship increases, 
household income and wealth tends to decline, income instability and unsecured debt increase, 
and decommodification rates increase (albeit still far below the rates for those in chronic 
poverty).  
 The duration of material hardship has some distinctive racial patterns as well. Chronic 
and episodic hardship rates for Black, Hispanic, and Other households are far above those of 
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White and Asian households. When education is considered as well, Black households with a BA 
head have similar chronic and episodic hardship rates as a White headed household with only a 
high school diploma even after controlling for income, wealth, and credit. White and Black 
households exist in different universes of risk when examined by income, which Black 
households often having to earn $70,000 to $100,000 more per year to match the same predicted 
probability of chronic hardship as White households.  
  
Conclusion 
 Examining various domains of hardship (Heflin 2017) does advance our knowledge of 
hardship, however the domain of time clearly needs to be considered on its own as well. 
Households in hardship are not some static class at the bottom of the income ladder. Over 35 
percent of households experienced some material hardship over a two year period of time. If 
poverty, only experienced by 20% of households over this period of time, is estimated to be 
nearly a normative experience for Americans at some point over their lives (Rank 2005), it is 
possible, perhaps even likely, that the proportion of Americans that experience material hardship 
over the course of their lives is considerably higher. However, we currently lack the necessary 
longitudinal data to conduct such an analysis. If the incidence of material hardship across one 
lifetime could be measured, perhaps it would then be possible to examine the intergenerational 
transmission of hardship much like current research into the intergenerational transmission of 
income poverty.  
The duration of material hardship is not evenly distributed across the population. The 
question of why Black households consistently have higher rates of material hardship regardless 
of the resources measured or the demographic and household-level factors requires further 
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research. On one hand, the answer is obvious. Why would any reasonable social scientist expect 
a population that was enslaved for centuries, endured generations of dispossession, political 
repression, and terroristic violence, that only gained the right to vote in living memory, to have 
similar levels of material hardship even when their pay checks resemble their white neighbors? 
The next step in this research agenda is to measure the precise mechanisms by which this racial 
gap in material hardship is reproduced and sustained over time.  
Some researchers argue that research into material hardship can “help policymakers 
create more targeted and effective interventions that help all Americans make ends meet” (Heflin 
2017).  Such an approach may not fully embrace how decoupled material hardship and income 
are. First, the assumption that policies aimed at supporting the material well-being of American 
households needs to be “targeted” is flawed. The U.S. social policy has emphasized a targeted, 
means tested safety net since the War on Poverty. This approach has resulted in a way of 
conceptualizing poverty, the OPM, and a welfare state that completely misses the vast majority 
of households that experience material hardship. Perhaps it is time for a less sophisticated 
approach.  
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Chapter 3 Tables and Figures 
 Table 3.1 Duration of Hardship and Poverty 
 No 
Poverty 
Episodic 
Poverty 
Chronic 
Poverty 
Total 
     
No Hardship  55.71 4.49 3.29 63.49 
SE (0.32) (0.13) (0.11) (0.31) 
Episodic 
Hardship  
15.38 3.21 2.55 21.14 
SE (0.23) (0.12) (0.10) (0.27) 
Chronic 
Hardship  
9.08 3.16 3.13 15.37 
SE (0.19) (0.11) (0.11) (0.23) 
Total % 80.17 10.87 8.96 100 
     
 
Table 3.2 Duration of Hidden Hardship and Hardship, Row Totals 
 No hidden 
hardship 
Episodic 
hidden 
hardship 
Chronic 
hidden 
hardship 
Total 
No Hardship  100 0 0 100 
SE 0 0 0  
Episodic Hardship  20.17 79.83 0 100 
SE (0.58) (0.58) 0  
Chronic Hardship  20.38 20.55 59.07 100 
SE (0.67) (0.67) (0.82)  
Total  73.15 18.47 8.37 100 
SE (0.28) (0.24) (0.17)  
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Figure 3.1 Duration of Poverty with Hardship 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Duration of Hardship with Poverty 
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Table 3.3 Duration of Hardship and Poverty by Race, Column Totals 
 Poverty Hardship 
 None Episodic Chronic None Episodic Chronic Total 
        
White  74.63  59.10  50.25  76.51  61.26  55.89  70.26  
SE (0.33) (0.99) (1.08) (0.34) (0.64) (0.83) (0.29) 
Black  10.12  16.11  23.29  8.83  16.59  19.99  12.10  
SE (0.22) (0.75) (0.91) (0.22) (0.49) (0.68) (0.20) 
Asian  3.21  3.35  3.31  3.64  2.88  2.07  3.25  
SE (0.12) (0.34) (0.37) (0.14) (0.20) (0.22) (0.10) 
Other  2.26  3.21  3.27  2.00  3.08  4.15  2.54  
SE (0.10) (0.32) (0.35) (0.10) (0.20) (0.31) (0.09) 
Hispanic  9.78  18.24  19.89  9.02  16.20  17.91  11.85  
SE (0.24) (0.84) (0.93) (0.25) (0.53) (0.68) (0.22) 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Table 3.4 Duration of Hardship and Poverty by Race, Row Totals 
 Poverty Hardship 
 None Episodic Chronic Sub-
Total 
None Episodic Chronic Sub-
Total 
         
White 84.56  9.08  6.37  100  69.52  19.63  10.85  100  
SE (0.27) (0.21) (0.18)  (0.32) (0.28) (0.22)  
Black  67.90  14.64  17.46  100  46.60  30.87  22.53  100  
SE (0.90) (0.69) (0.71)  (0.91) (0.84) (0.76)  
Asian 79.57  11.25  9.17  100  71.37  19.97  8.66  100  
SE (1.38) (1.08) (0.98)  (1.44) (1.27) (0.89)  
Other 73.83  14.23  11.95  100  50.37  27.34  22.29  100  
SE (1.67) (1.32) (1.23)  (1.79) (1.57) (1.48)  
Hispanic  67.57  17.07  15.35  100  48.61  30.78  20.61  100  
SE (1.00) (0.81) (0.76)  (1.00) (0.93) (0.80)  
Total  80.17  10.87  8.96  100  63.84  22.52  13.64  100  
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Table 3.5 Duration of Hardship and Poverty by Education, Column Totals 
 Poverty Hardship  
 None Episodic Chronic None Episodic Chronic Total 
        
Less 
than HS 
7.79  16.43  27.77  7.85  13.26  16.65  10.27  
SE (0.19) (0.72) (0.96) (0.20) (0.43) (0.61) (0.18) 
High 
School 
22.66  28.33  27.30  22.24  27.63  29.03  24.38  
SE (0.30) (0.89) (0.95) (0.31) (0.58) (0.76) (0.26) 
Some 
college 
34.85  35.16  32.85  32.70  37.74  40.19  34.86  
SE (0.34) (0.95) (1.03) (0.36) (0.63) (0.81) (0.29) 
BA 21.48  13.28  8.70  22.84  14.47  10.55  19.28  
SE (0.30) (0.67) (0.67) (0.32) (0.47) (0.51) (0.24) 
BA+  13.22  6.81  3.39  14.37  6.90  3.56  11.21  
SE (0.24) (0.51) (0.39) (0.27) (0.33) (0.31) (0.19) 
Total 100  100  100  100  100  100  100  
 
 Table 3.6 Duration of Hardship and Poverty by Education, Row Totals 
 Poverty  Hardship  
 None Episodic Chronic Total None Episodic Chronic Total 
         
Less 
than HS  
59.38  16.97  23.65  100  48.82  29.07  22.12  100  
SE (0.96) (0.74) (0.83)  (0.92) (0.85) (0.78)  
HS  76.68  12.99  10.32  100  58.23  25.52  16.24  100  
SE (0.56) (0.45) (0.39)  (0.60) (0.54) (0.46)  
Some 
college  
80.51  11.01  8.48  100  59.89  24.38  15.73  100  
SE (0.44) (0.35) (0.31)  (0.51) (0.45) (0.38)  
BA  88.57  7.42  4.01  100  75.63  16.90  7.46  100  
SE (0.48) (0.38) (0.32)  (0.61) (0.54) (0.36)  
BA+ 91.04  6.36  2.61  100  81.80  13.86  4.34  100  
SE (0.56) (0.48) (0.30)  (0.70) (0.63) (0.37)  
Total  80.17  10.87  8.96  100  63.84  22.52  13.64  100  
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 Table 3.7 Duration of Hardship and Poverty by Household Type, Column Totals 
 Poverty Hardship  
 None Episodic Chronic None Episodic Chronic Total 
        
Senior 25.32  12.58  16.29  27.09  15.32  9.25  22.00  
SE (0.30) (0.60) (0.74) (0.32) (0.43) (0.43) (0.24) 
Prime 
kids 
26.98  38.40  41.58  26.03  35.37  38.27  29.81  
SE (0.32) (0.97) (1.09) (0.34) (0.63) (0.81) (0.28) 
Prime no 
kids 
47.70  49.03  42.13  46.88  49.31  52.48  48.19  
SE (0.36) (0.99) (1.07) (0.38) (0.65) (0.83) (0.30) 
Total % 100  100  100  100  100  100  100  
 
 Table 3.8 Duration of Hardship and Poverty by Household Type, Row Totals 
 Poverty  Hardship  
 None Episodic Chronic Total None Episodic Chronic Total 
         
Senior  87.78  5.91  6.31  100  78.59  15.68  5.73  100  
SE (0.40) (0.29) (0.30)  (0.48) (0.43) (0.27)  
Prime 
kids  
73.25  14.13  12.62  100  55.76  26.72  17.51  100  
SE (0.55) (0.43) (0.42)  (0.57) (0.51) (0.44)  
Prime 
no kids  
80.77  11.25  7.98  100  62.10  23.04  14.85  100  
SE (0.37) (0.30) (0.25)  (0.43) (0.38) (0.31)  
Total  80.17  10.87  8.96  100  63.84  22.52  13.64  100  
SE (0.26) (0.20) (0.19)  (0.29) (0.26) (0.21)  
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 Table 3.9 Mean Household Resource Measures by Hardship and Poverty Duration 
 Poverty Hardship  
 None Episodic Chronic None Episodic Chronic Total 
Income  $79,550   $27,907   $9,449   $77,505   $51,930   $39,345   $66,552  
SE (499.88) (695.49) (162.71) (571.41) (652.18) (695.47) (415.01) 
Wealth  $248,651   $104,452   $59,148   $274,292   $114,866   $55,243   $208,672  
SE (2608.33) (4599.59) (3337.76) (2917.24) (2859.34) (2578.59) (2071.89) 
Unsecured 
Debt 
 $8,577   $7,743   $4,397   $7,374   $9,203   $10,079   $8,147  
SE (169.00) (465.75) (340.29) (166.37) (330.86) (381.01) (139.64) 
CV of Income 0.16 0.55 0.49 0.21 0.32 0.34 0.25 
SE 0.00  (0.01) (0.01) 0.00  0.00  (0.01) 0.00  
Decommod-
ification 
0.33 0.44 0.64 0.36 0.33 0.38 0.36 
SE 0.00  (0.01) (0.01) 0.00  (0.01) (0.01) 0.00  
Decommodific
ation under 65 
only 
.1501012 .3748897 .5670071 .1680973 .2383626 .325857 .2096571 
SE .002407 .0098861 .012512   .0028836 .0053963   .0074305 .0024926 
 
 
 Table 3.10 Type of Hardship and Duration of Hardship 
 Episodic 
Hardship 
Chronic Hardship All 
Difficulty meeting expenses 
% 
32.9 66.21 16.1 
Missed rent/mortgage % 15.41 34.41 7.98 
Evicted % 0.84 2.05 0.46 
Missed utility payment % 19.02 47.23 10.48 
Utilities cut % 2.74 8.64 1.75 
Phone cut off % 6.63 16.8 3.7 
Unable to afford doctor % 15.22 34.26 7.92 
Unable to afford dentist % 19.14 41.42 9.75 
Food insecure % 22.94 46 11.2 
Mean hardship count 1.35 2.97 0.69 
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Table 3.11 Types of Hardship by Duration, Row Totals 
 Episodic 
Hardship 
Chronic Hardship Total 
Difficulty meeting expenses 
% 
46.24 53.76 100 
Missed rent/mortgage % 43.66 56.34 100 
Evicted % 41.4 58.6 100 
Missed utility payment % 41.07 58.93 100 
Utilities cut % 35.43 64.57 100 
Phone cut off % 40.58 59.42 100 
Unable to afford doctor % 43.47 56.53 100 
Unable to afford dentist % 44.44 55.56 100 
Food insecure % 46.33 53.67 100 
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Figure 3.3 Predicted Probability of Duration of Hardship and Poverty by Race
 
Figure 3.4 Predicted Probability of Duration of Hardship and Poverty by Education 
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Figure 3.5 Predicted Probability of the Duration of Hardship and Poverty by Education and Race 
 
Figure 3.6 Predicted Probability of Duration of Hardship and Poverty by Income 
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Figure 3.7 Predicted Probability of the Duration of Hardship by Race and Income 
 
Figure 3.8 Predicted Probability of the Duration of Poverty by Race and Income 
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Figure 3.9 Predicted Probability of the Duration of Hardship and Poverty by Wealth
 
Figure 3.10 Predicted Probability of the Duration of Hardship by Wealth and Race 
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Chapter 4  Bad Luck and Good Luck: Entering and Exiting a Spell of Material Hardship 
 
Introduction 
Researchers who examine spells of poverty have sought to identify specific events, such 
as unemployment or divorce, that may lead to a household entering a spell of poverty (McKernan 
and Ratcliffe 2005; Seefeldt 2017). After ample descriptive evidence on the distribution (chapter 
2) and dynamics (chapter 3) of material hardship, I turn to the question of why material hardship 
occurs and how families leave it behind. That is, what sort of events lead to entry into, or exit 
from, a spell of material hardship? 
Previous Literature 
A recent paper by Colleen Heflin (Heflin 2016) assesses entry into, but not exits from, 
spells of hardship. Heflin’s approach is aimed at examining different types of hardship (medical 
hardship, food insecurity, housing hardship, and essential expense hardship) and their 
relationship to various external shocks (employment shock, income shocks, disability shocks, 
and household composition changes). While the types of shocks examined in this paper are 
informed by Heflin’s approach, the concern with the shock is ultimately different. This paper 
builds on the work of Heflin to examine stratification in response to shocks. Finally, there are 
some minor methodological differences. Whereas Heflin uses a linear probability model with 
lagged dependent variables, I use multinomial logistic regressions.  
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Data, Measures, and Methods 
Data 
This chapter uses the 2008 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, 
specifically waves 6-9. The 2008 panel of the SIPP is the only panel of any nationally 
representative longitudinal survey to repeatedly measure material hardship and thus affords a 
unique opportunity to measure and understand spells of material hardship. Wave 6 was fielded in 
2010, and wave 9 followed up with respondents a year later in 2011. While responses were 
collected throughout 2010 and 2011, the SIPP rotation groups are staggered such that 12 months 
pass between wave 6 and wave 9 for each household. For further information on trends in 
material hardship, see Appendix B.   
As in chapters 2 and 3, material hardship is defined as experiencing any 1 or more of the 
following: 
1) Difficulty meeting essential expenses 
2) Missed rent or mortgage payment 
3) Eviction 
4) Missed utility payment 
5) Utility shutoffs 
6) Telephone disconnection due to nonpayment 
7) Inability to see a doctor 
8) Inability to see a dentist 
9) Food insecurity 
Unless otherwise noted, poverty means income poverty as defined by the Official Poverty 
Measure.  
 While the sample is restricted to household heads, a number of measures of household 
events draw upon information from other members of the household. Events considered for entry 
into a spell of hardship include 1) anyone in the household becoming unemployed in waves 6 
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through 9; 2) anyone in the household experiencing a disability in waves 6 through 9; 3) 
additional children under 18 added to the household in waves 6 through 9; 4) an income spike, 
defined as income reported at a wave that is 25% above or below the mean household income for 
the period wave 6 through wave 9 (this is consistent with the definition of income instability 
used in Morduch and Schneider (2017)); 5) divorce at any point in waves 6 through 9; 6) any 
moves or relocations in waves 6 through 9. 
 The events measured for both entry into and exit from a spell of hardship are often used 
in poverty research. For example, McKernan and Ratcliffe (2005) examine birth of child, 
changes in marital status, changes in employment status, changes in disability or health status, 
changes in educational attainment, and changes in economic conditions in relation to entry and 
exit from a spell of income poverty. Heflin (2016) considers employment shocks, household 
formation shocks, residential changes, income changes, household size changes, and disability 
shocks in relation to spells of material hardship in the SIPP, and maternal health, household 
composition, and income changes in other surveys (Heflin and Butler 2013). For a full review of 
the study of shocks and events as they relate to entry and exit from a spell of income poverty, see 
Reigg Cellini, McKernan, and Ratcliffe (2008). For events that may predict exit from a spell of 
hardship or poverty I examine 1) job gains for anyone in the household; 2) assistance from 
family, friends, social services, and non-profits; 3) an increase in income; 4) an increase in debt; 
5) an increase in transfers; 6) getting married.  
 Descriptive statistics are used to provide initial understanding of the dynamics of spells 
of hardship and poverty. When assessing the events in question, I use logistic regressions with 
the following control variables 
1) Demographic variables 
 76 
a. Race and ethnicity: five categories including white (non-Hispanic), black 
(non-Hispanic), Asian-American (non-Hispanic), other (non-Hispanic), and 
Hispanic (of any race).  
b. Education: a categorical variable for the household head reporting less than 
high school, high school, some college, a bachelor’s degree, or more than a 
bachelor’s degree.  
c. Gender: a categorical measure of the household head’s reported gender, either 
male or female.  
d. Age: a continuous measure of the age of the household head 
e. Number of children in the household: a continuous measure of the number of 
children under the age of 18 in the household 
f. Marital status: a categorical measure of marital status including married with 
spouse present, married with spouse absent, separated, divorced, widowed, 
and never married.  
2) Income 
a. Total household income from all sources 
b. Welfare transfers: the total of both cash transfers and near-cash transfers from 
all government programs such as SNAP, UI, WIC, Section 8, SSI, SSDI, 
Social Security, TANF, etc.  
c. A measure of income instability (see chapter 1 for a full description of income 
instability 
3) Wealth 
a. Total household net worth 
b. Total household unsecured debt 
4) Events 
a. Additional children in the household 
b. Income spikes 
c. Change in disability status 
d. Divorce  
e. Unemployment 
f. Relocation 
g. Marriage 
h. Assistance from friends and family 
i. Assistance from non-profits or social services 
j. Start of employment 
	
Results 
Descriptive Results 
Even during the aftermath of the Great Recession (2010-2011),  64% of households avoid 
material hardship. Approximately 13% entered a spell of hardship, 9% exited a spell of hardship, 
and 13% remained in hardship at both time points (see Table 4.1). By entering hardship I mean a 
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household did not experience any hardship in 2010 but did in 2011. By exiting hardship I mean a 
household that experienced any hardship in 2010 but not in 2011. Always hardship here means 
households that experience hardship in both 2010 and 2011.  
As established in Chapter 2 poverty and material hardship are distinct phenomena and 
concepts with some, but far from complete, overlap in the population. Chapter 3 examines the 
dynamics of hardship and income poverty. While 63% of households avoided hardship at both 
time points, when income poverty is also measured, only slightly more than half of households—
56%—remained economically secure over the span of one year. This is important information 
because most nationally representative surveys do not measure material hardship, are not 
longitudinal, or involve measurements across time at intervals greater than one year. At the other 
extreme, only 3% of households remain in both poverty and some type of material hardship at 
both points in time.  
Between these two extremes of constant economic security and constant and concurrent 
poverty and material hardship lies the 41% of households that move between some form of 
hardship and/or poverty in a given year. This chapter explores the events and shocks that can 
drive a household into, or out of, a spell of material hardship.     
 Figures about material hardship at the aggregate level obscure important trends, 
particularly trends by race. Table 4.3 shows that racial/ethnic groups form two clusters: White 
(non-Hispanic) and Asian doing relatively well, and Black, Hispanic (any race) and Other facing 
higher rates of material hardship. Approximately 70% of White and Asian households avoid 
material hardship entirely while about half or less of all other households avoid material 
hardship.  
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Hidden hardship trends by race resemble overall hardship trends (Table 4.4). Nationally, 
73% of households avoid material hardship in 2010 and 2011 while 8% of households 
experience hidden hardship over both years. Hidden hardship rates are highest for Black, 
Hispanic, and Other, around 36%, compared to less than 25% for Whites and Asians. Despite 
lower rates of hardship, poverty, and hidden hardship, Whites make up a majority of households 
in any combination of hardship or poverty at any time point.  
 
Events Predicting Spells of Poverty and Hardship 
What life events are associated with entry into, or exit from, a spell of material hardship? 
The previous literature on spells of poverty indicates that changes in household composition such 
as divorce or additional children, or external shocks to the household unit such as unemployment 
or moving, are associated with entering into or exiting from spells of poverty. This section 
expands this approach to the question of material hardship.  
 Table 4.5 examines six household events in relation to changes in hardship status: 
additional children under 18 added to the household, income spikes of 25% above or below mean 
income, additional disability status for any member of the household, divorce for any member of 
the household, unemployment for any member of the household, and the number of household 
moves during the period under consideration. To be clear, all of these are changes in the 
household at some point in 2010 and 2011. For example, a household that added a child in wave 
2 is not considered to have added a child (since this would have occurred years ago and is thus 
not a new event taking place between the repeated measures of material hardship) whereas a 
household that adds a child under 18 in wave 7 would be counted as adding a child.  
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 Across all six events, households that manage to avoid these events, shocks, or changes 
to the household structure avoid hardship at both time points at similar rates to the population as 
a whole, around 63%. Across all six events, households that experience these shocks are more 
likely to experience hardship at one or both time points. Households that add children are 31% 
more likely to enter hardship than those that do not add children. Households with income spikes 
are 46% more likely to enter hardship than those with stable incomes. The onset of a disability 
makes a household 39% more likely to enter hardship. Households with divorce are 106% more 
likely to enter hardship than households that remain married. Unemployment—of anyone in the 
household, not just the household head—makes a household 87% more likely to enter hardship 
than all others (employed and not in labor force are combined here). Households that relocate are 
63 percent more likely to enter hardship. Clearly, these events are associated with increased 
chances of entering a spell of material hardship.  
 The next column in Table 4.5 shows the percentage of households that exit a spell of 
hardship, that is to say households that experienced some hardship in 2010 but not in 2011. 
These rates are also higher for households that experience these 6 events. In other words, these 
households that are going to experience a major disruptive event in the future already experience 
higher rates of hardship in the past. Something about these households already sets them apart 
from the households that do not experience these disruptive shocks.  
Table 4.6 reports cross tabulations of events related to exiting a spell of hardship. There 
does not appear to be much difference in exiting hardship for household heads who remain 
unmarried and those who become married between waves 6 and 9. Households in which 
someone gains a job are slightly more likely to exit material hardship than those that do not gain 
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a job. Finally, households that receive some sort of assistance from either family or friends, or 
from social services or non-profits, are much more likely to exit material hardship.  
 
Regression Results 
I use logistic regressions to learn about the independent associations between events and 
spells of hardship. Two dependent variables are used: one which categorizes households as never 
experiencing hardship or entering into a spell of material hardship and a second which 
categorizes households as experiencing constant material hardship or exiting a spell of material 
hardship. Each dichotomous outcome variable is modeled in five ways: 
1. A baseline model with the event in question (e.g. divorce, unemployment) as the only 
independent variable 
2. Model 1 expands on the baseline model to include race.  
3. Model 2 includes a full set of demographic variables: race, education, gender, age, 
age squared, number of children under 18 in the household, marital status.  
4. Model 3 expands upon Model 2 to include household income, welfare state transfers, 
and income instability 
5. Model 4 expands upon Model 3 to include net worth and unsecured debt 
 
The first set of charts display the predicted probability of entering a spell of hardship. The 
reference category is set to households that never experience hardship. The second set of charts 
displays the predicted probability of exiting a spell of hardship. Accordingly, the reference 
category is set to households that are in material hardship at both timepoints.  
Entering a Spell of Hardship 
Divorce 
 Households that experience divorce have a predicted probability of entering into a spell 
of material hardship of .26 in comparison to the stably married who have a predicted probability 
of .12. Figure 4.1 reports that white married households have similar predicted probabilities, but 
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white households that experience divorce have a predicted probability of entry into hardship of 
only .13 in Model 4 which is equivalent to that for black, stably married households (the point 
estimate is slightly higher for black households, but the standards errors overlap making the 
difference non-significant). The predicted probability of black households entering material 
hardship after experiencing divorce is higher, about .20 in Model 4. Note that for examining 
divorce, the usual control variable for marital status is omitted.  
Disability 
 Households in which a household member becomes disabled have a predicted probability 
of entering a spell of material hardship of .29 compared to .15 for households in which there are 
no new reported disabilities (there may be household members with disabilities that pre-date the 
period of the study) (Figure 4.2). White households without new disabilities have the lowest 
predicted probabilities of experiencing material hardship, around .14, while White households 
that experience a new disability have a predicted probability of .18 for entering material 
hardship. This is the same predicted probability a Black household without any new disabilities 
has of entering a spell of material hardship. Black households with a disability have higher 
predicted probabilities, approximately .24. As with divorce, White households experiencing the 
unpredictable shock of a newfound disability have the same predicted probability of entering 
material hardship as a Black household that avoids such a shock.  
Unemployment 
 Similar to divorce and disability, households in which any member becomes unemployed 
experience higher predicted probabilities of material hardship compared to households in which 
no member becomes unemployed (Figure 4.3). Note that this binary variable of unemployment is 
deliberately constructed to produce conservative estimates of the impact of unemployment. The 
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“no unemployment” category includes workers, individuals not in the labor force such as the 
aged or disabled, so-called “discouraged workers” who are no longer looking for work, and 
unemployed workers who became unemployed prior to the period of the study. A worker in a 
household is categorized as unemployed only if they became newly unemployed at some point in 
waves 6-9. This construction of the unemployment variable enables us to capture the immediate 
shock of unemployment on the household. Households in which there is no new unemployment 
have a predicted probability of entering hardship of .15 compared to households in which there is 
a newly unemployed worker that has a predicted probability of .36. Again, white households 
have the lowest predicted probability, about .14 regardless of model, and black households with 
a new unemployed worker have predicted probabilities of .26. White households with a newly 
unemployed worker strongly resemble black households without a newly unemployed worker. 
Even after including income and wealth measures, the predicted probabilities are around .19 for 
both segments of the population.  
 
Additional children 
 It is conceivable that the additional cost of raising children and possible disruptions to 
work schedules and opportunities could be associated with increased predicted probabilities of 
entering material hardship (Figure 4.4). Indeed, these data show this to be the case. Households 
without any additional children have a predicted probability of entering material hardship of .16 
compared to households that add a child of any age under 18 which have a predicted probability 
of .23. Note that households without additional children may have children of their own already 
(the average number of children in a household in this group is just under .5) but they did not add 
any additional children to the household between waves 6 and 9. Unlike divorce and 
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unemployment, white households that experience the shock of an additional child in the 
household have lower predicted probabilities of entering material hardship (.15) than black 
households that do not add an additional child (.19).   
Moving 
 Moving a household, whether due to eviction or pursuing a job opportunity, is a costly 
and time-consuming event. Households without any reported moves have a predicted probability 
of entering material hardship of .16 whereas households that do have any move (of any distance, 
or even multiple moves) have a predicted probability of entering hardship of .27 (Figure 4.5). 
The pattern by race is, by now, familiar: white households without a move have the lowest 
predicted probability of entering hardship (.14), black households with a move have the highest 
(.23), and there is virtually no difference in the predicted probabilities for white households with 
a move compared to black households without a move (.17 and .19).   
Income Spikes 
 The final event measured in relation to entering a spell of material hardship is income 
spikes. Following the work of Morduch and Schneider (2017), I define an income spike as any 
month in which reported income is 25% below the mean household income for waves 6-9. In 
order to account for the problem of seam bias in the SIPP, only the reference month is kept 
which means that these reports of monthly income occur every 4 months. Given the volatility of 
income found in Morduch’s Financial Diaries project, this approach likely results in an 
underestimate of downward income spikes experienced in the sample during this time frame.  
 Households that report stable incomes have a predicted probability of entering into a spell 
of hardship of .12 whereas households with a downward income spike have a predicted 
probability of .24 (Figure 4.6). By race, white households with stable incomes have low 
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predicted probabilities of entering hardship (.14) whereas black households with income spikes 
have predicted probabilities between of .22. White households with income spikes resemble 
black households with stable incomes.  
Exiting a Spell of Hardship 
 While some events may augur entry into a spell of material hardship, it is also important 
to consider the ways in which households might exit a spell of material hardship. This section 
explores marriage, job gains, help from family or friends, and help from social services and non-
profits, and positive income shocks as possible predictors of exiting a spell of material hardship. 
As above, this section reports predicted probabilities based on logistic regressions. In contrast to 
the above, the outcome of interest is households that move out of material hardship between 
wave 6 and wave 9.  
Job Gain 
 Perhaps the most obvious way to increase the immediate resources available to a 
household is to get a job. In comparing households in which some member becomes employed 
who was previously unemployed to households in which no such similar job gain occurs (this 
category then includes households that are stably employed, unemployed, lose a job, or are not in 
the labor force), a somewhat counterintuitive predicted probability is returned. Households 
where a member gains a job have a .36 predicted probability of exiting material hardship 
compared to ..42 for those households where no one gains a job (Figure 4.7). This could be due 
to a number of factors. First, by including households that are both in material hardship at wave 
6 and stably employed in the baseline group, the probability of exiting material hardship 
becomes somewhat inflated. Second, it is possible that the initial period of starting a new job 
comes with more expenses—such as the cost of uniforms, child care, transportation, increased 
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food consumption—than are offset by the increase in income. There are no statistically 
significant differences by race for job gains.  
  Marriage 
 Marriage is often presented as a social institution that results in resource sharing and thus 
contributes to lower rates of poverty. When comparing household heads who marry and 
household heads that do not marry (they may be stably unmarried or married, but not newly 
married), the predicted probability of exiting material hardship is .37 for the unmarried and .47 
for those who marry. (Figure 4.8). There is no statistically significant difference by race or event 
in model 4, which suggests that this observed difference in exiting hardship by marriage is 
largely an artifact of increased household income, and potentially decreased living expenses.  
Help from family and friends 
 After almost all hardship questions, there is a series of follow up questions about whether 
or not the household received assistance from family, friends, social services, non-profits, or 
other sources. The only form of hardship that this is not asked about is food insecurity. Figure 
4.9 combines assistance from family and friends into one category and compares it to households 
that did not report any assistance from family, friends, social services, or non-profits. The 
predicted probability of exiting hardship for households with no assistance is .42 in contrast to 
households that receive assistance from family or friends at .27 (Figure 4.9). Broken down by 
race, the results are similar, with no significant differences by race. Why are households that 
receive help less likely to exit material hardship? I suspect that households that eventually ask 
for and receive informal assistance from family and friends are households that are doing worse 
off than those who do not request or receive such assistance. Households that receive assistance 
have a mean hardship count of 2.6 compared to 1.6 for households that do not receive assistance. 
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By the time a household actually gets help, they are so deep in hardship that the assistance is 
quite literally too little, too late.   
 
Help from social services and non-profits 
 In addition to families and friends, follow up questions after hardship ask about 
assistance from institutional sources such as social services and non-profits, which have been 
combined into one category. Households without any assistance have a .42 predicted probability 
of exiting material hardship compared to the .23 predicted probability for those that receive 
assistance from social services and non-profits (Figure 4.10). White and black households have 
similar patterns and there are no statistically significant differences between racial groups. Much 
like informal assistance from family and friends, households that receive assistance have higher 
mean hardship counts (2.6) than those that do not receive assistance (1.7). The more formal 
safety net also seems to deliver assistance only when a household is in a deep spell of hardship, 
and then in insufficient quantity or duration to lift the household out of hardship.  
 
  Upward Income Spikes 
 Households that experience an upward income spike, that is to say a month in which 
household income is 25% above the mean for the 2010-2011 period, do not report any 
statistically significant increase in the probability of exiting material hardship, nor is there any 
discernable difference by race. This suggests that one time infusions of cash are less likely to 
provide financial and material stability to a household than long term, dependable income.  
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Discussion 
Poverty research has, since at least the 1980s, understood that income poverty is not a 
static state, that households move in and out of spells of poverty. Chronic poverty is the 
exception, rather than the rule. Prior to the 2008 panel of the SIPP, no nationally representative 
survey asked the Mayer-style material hardship measures repeatedly. At best, all researchers 
could do is provide cross sectional estimates. This chapter reports findings about who 
experiences spells of hardship, and what events precede entry into and exit from a spell of 
hardship.  
The data in the 2008 panel of the SIPP reveals that spells of material hardship are 
common, indeed more common than spells of income poverty. More than a third of households 
experienced material hardship at one or both time points. When income poverty is also included, 
only 55% of households manage to be economically secure at both time points, but only 3.13% 
are in both poverty and material hardship at both points in time. While this 3.13 percent 
represents a small percentage of the population, its still means that several million people, 
including children, experienced chronic material hardship and poverty.  
Overshadowing this segment of the population in chronic hardship and poverty is the 
over 35% of households that move into or out of hardship between 2010 and 2011, compared to 
the 20% that move in and out of income poverty. 
The theoretical model offered by Mayer (1993) suggests that material hardship occurs 
when the demands on a household’s resources exceed the available supply of resources. Hefflin 
(2016), building on research regarding spells of poverty (Iceland and Bauman 2007; McKernan 
and Ratcliffe 2005), suggests that shocks to the household unit may be associated with entering a 
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spell of material hardship. Such shocks then cause a household’s resources to fall, increase the 
demand on resources, or both.  
The next steps for this line of research fall into two tracks. First, further research is 
needed to refine our understanding of the mechanisms that lead to household entry into, and exit 
form, a spell of material hardship. Specifically, we need qualitative work that can provide further 
context for racial disparities in how these mechanisms function. Second, a line of research on the 
interaction between types of material hardship may be beneficial. It is entirely possible that there 
are patterns various hardships within a spell of hardship that, if properly understood, may enable 
effective and efficient interventions.  
The information in this chapter is largely concurrent with Hefflin’s findings. However, I 
also show that in terms of the risk of entering into a spell of material hardship, or exiting a spell 
of material hardship, there are large and durable racial gaps that cannot be explained away by 
income or wealth. In general, when it comes to entering a spell of material hardship, black 
households that avoid a given shock strongly resemble white households that experience a shock.  
The sociological implication of these findings is that the material well-being of 
households by racial and ethnic groups in the United States is not reducible to income or wealth. 
While high levels of racial stratification by income and wealth are well known, it is clear here 
that these proxies for material well-being still underestimate the extent to which different racial 
groups live in different material worlds in the United States.  
The implications of these findings for social work and public policy are multifaceted. On 
one hand, the purpose of the welfare state is to buffer people from external shocks and the 
vagaries of life in a market society. This chapter shows how wildly different the impact of these 
events, these shocks, can be on households. To design a policy that buffers households from such 
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shocks without taking into account the underlying probability of such shocks, or the baseline 
material well-being of households prior to such shocks, runs the risk of creating a social safety 
net the reinforces preexisting racial hierarchies in material well-being. Indeed, this has been a 
feature of the US social safety net since its beginning (Rodems and Shaefer 2016). 
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Chapter 4 Tables and Figures 
Table 4.1 Spells of Hardship 
Category Percent of Households 
No hardship  63.84  
SE (0.29) 
Entered hardship  13.10  
SE (0.21) 
Exited hardship 9.42  
SE (0.18) 
Always hardship 13.64  
SE (0.21) 
Total  100.00  
 
 
Table 4.2 Spells of Poverty and Hardship 
 No 
hardship 
Entered 
hardship 
Exited 
hardship 
Always 
hardship 
Total 
      
No poverty % 55.71  7.50  7.88  9.08  80.17  
SE (0.32) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.26) 
Entered poverty % 2.30  0.93  0.72  1.61  5.56  
SE (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.15) 
Exited poverty % 2.19  0.77  0.79  1.54  5.30  
SE (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.15) 
Always poor % 3.29  1.33  1.22  3.13  8.96  
SE (0.11) (0.08) (0.07) (0.11) (0.19) 
Total % 63.49  10.52  10.62  15.37  100.00  
No poverty % (0.31) (0.20) (0.20) (0.23)  
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Table 4.3 Hardship Spell by Race, Column Totals 
 White  Black  Asian  Other  Hispanic  Total 
       
No hardship % 69.52  46.60  71.37  50.37  48.61  63.84  
SE (0.32) (0.91) (1.44) (1.79) (1.00) (0.29) 
Entered hardship 
% 
11.21  18.75  12.09  17.10  17.96  13.10  
SE (0.22) (0.72) (1.05) (1.32) (0.76) (0.21) 
Exited hardship % 8.43  12.12  7.88  10.23  12.82  9.42  
SE (0.20) (0.57) (0.84) (1.06) (0.69) (0.18) 
Always hardship 
% 
10.85  22.53  8.66  22.29  20.61  13.64  
SE (0.22) (0.76) (0.89) (1.48) (0.80) (0.21) 
Total % 100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  
 
Table 4.4 Hidden Hardship Spells by Race, Column Totals 
 White Black Asian  Other Hispanic Total 
No hidden hardship 76.29  63.50  78.94  63.98  64.26  73.15  
SE (0.30) (0.90) (1.31) (1.77) (0.99) (0.28) 
Entered hidden 
hardship 
8.01  12.41  8.19  11.45  11.71  9.05  
SE (0.19) (0.62) (0.89) (1.15) (0.65) (0.18) 
Exited Hidden 
hardship 
8.56  11.93  6.37  11.27  12.59  9.42  
SE (0.20) (0.60) (0.77) (1.17) (0.69) (0.18) 
Constant hidden 
hardship 
7.15  12.16  6.50  13.30  11.43  8.37  
SE (0.18) (0.62) (0.79) (1.25) (0.65) (0.17) 
Total 100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  
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Table 4.5 Spells of Hardship by Events, Row Totals 
 No 
hardship 
Entered 
hardship 
Exited 
hardship 
Always 
hardship 
Total 
Additional Children 
No  64.74  12.67  9.14  13.45  100 
SE (0.31) (0.22) (0.19) (0.22)  
Yes 56.46  16.61  11.72  15.21  100 
SE (0.95) (0.71) (0.63) (0.68)  
Income Spike 
No 67.53  11.61  8.87  12.00  100 
SE (0.34) (0.23) (0.20) (0.23)  
Yes 54.46  16.90  10.83  17.82  100 
SE (0.58) (0.44) (0.37) (0.44)  
Disability 
No 67.88  12.37  8.99  10.76  100 
SE (0.31) (0.22) (0.19) (0.21)  
Yes 41.82  17.06  11.78  29.35  100 
SE (0.74) (0.57) (0.48) (0.68)  
Marital Change 
Always 
married 
69.64  9.49  9.61  11.25  100 
SE (0.42) (0.27) (0.27) (0.29)  
Became 
divorced 
59.26  20.61  8.25  11.88  100 
SE (1.89) (1.61) (1.07) (1.18)  
Unemployment 
No 66.78  11.98  9.20  12.04  100 
SE (0.30) (0.21) (0.19) (0.21)  
Yes 39.92  22.21  11.21  26.67  100 
SE (0.95) (0.81) (0.63) (0.84)  
Moves 
No move 65.38  12.13  9.28  13.20  100 
SE (0.31) (0.21) (0.19) (0.22)  
Any move 53.46  19.60  10.35  16.59  100 
SE (0.88) (0.70) (0.54) (0.66)  
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Table 4.6 Spells of Hardship by Events, Column Totals 
 No 
hardship 
Entered 
hardship 
Exited 
hardship 
Always 
hardship 
Total 
Marital status     
Remained 
Unmarried % 
58.30  14.99  9.78  16.92  100.00  
SE (0.45) (0.32) (0.27) (0.34)  
Got married % 67.58  18.22  6.72  7.48  100.00  
SE (1.00) (0.82) (0.54) (0.58)  
Help from family and friends    
No 65.21  11.64  9.83  13.32  100.00  
SE (0.31) (0.21) (0.19) (0.22)  
Yes 0.00  0.00  26.75  73.25  100.00  
SE 0.00  0.00  (1.77) (1.77)  
Help from Social Services or Non-Profits   
No 64.69  11.55  10.04  13.72  100.00  
SE (0.31) (0.21) (0.19) (0.22)  
Yes 0.00  0.00  22.73  77.27  100.00  
SE 0.00  0.00  (2.00) (2.00)  
Job Gain      
No 66.04  12.31  9.09  12.56  100.00  
SE (0.31) (0.22) (0.19) (0.22)  
Yes 50.50  17.89  11.42  20.18  100.00  
SE (0.84) (0.65) (0.54) (0.68)  
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Figure 4.1 Predicted Probability of Entering Hardship by Divorce 
 
Figure 4.2 Predicted Probability of Entering Hardship by Disability 
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Figure 4.3 Predicted Probability of Entering Hardship by Unemployment 
 
Figure 4.4 Predicted Probability of Entering Hardship by Additional Children 
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Figure 4.5 Predicted Probability of Entering Hardship by Moving 
 
Figure 4.6 Predicted Probability of Entering Hardship by Income Spike 
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Figure 4.7 Predicted Probability of Exiting Hardship by Job Gain 
 
Figure 4.8 Predicted Probability of Exiting Hardship by Marriage 
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Figure 4.9 Predicted Probability of Exiting Hardship with Informal Assistance
 
Figure 4.10 Predicted Probability of Exiting Hardship with Formal Assistance 
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Figure 4.11Predicted Probability of Exiting Hardship by Upward Income Spike and Race 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
 
The analysis presented in this dissertation lays out a different conception of poverty than 
is often used in the literature. The advantages of using material hardship measures are twofold: 
they avoid unnecessary and arbitrary income cutoffs, and they correspond to the types of 
assistance provided by the US welfare state. We now know that material hardship is far more 
widespread than previously thought, that fewer American households are economically secure, 
that our most common measure of poverty obscures more than it illuminates, and that deep racial 
disparities exist in the probability of experiencing material hardship. Hidden hardship haunts 
non-poor Americans, and non-white Americans compete in this market society at a distinct 
material disadvantage.  
The path recently charted by Heflin (Heflin 2016; Heflin et al. 2009) of breaking down 
material hardship into types of hardship will be useful for future work on the mechanisms that 
cause material hardship, but they do run the risk of obscuring the full extent of this social 
problem. Understanding the mechanisms that cause a household to enter into a spell of specific 
type or category of hardship, and to exit from them, is an important next step, but one that also 
runs the risk of re-creating social policy silos that are incapable of considering household well-
being as a whole.  
Specific attention is needed to differences in mechanisms by race. Given the strong racial 
disparities in the experience of material hardship, the precise mechanisms may differ as well. For 
example, just as the experiences of white and black job seekers are different (Pager 2003), it is 
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possible that the costs of daily life for non-whites are just higher (e.g. higher interest rates). It is 
also possible that the social networks in which households are embedded differ in their makeup 
and in the reciprocal social demands placed on them. In addition to research on mechanisms, a 
better understanding of income flows and spending over the short term is needed. The Financial 
Diaries Project (Morduch and Schneider 2017) is a step in this direction.  
 The material well-being of American households has implications for American politics. 
Through the rise of right-wing populism, it is clear that material, economic matters and issues of 
identity intersect and interact in ways that are not yet fully understood (Hochschild 2016). Even 
basic questions about how households experiencing material hardship engage in politics remain 
unexplored.  
Little is known about geographic disparities in material hardship. Questions about state-
level policies or regional distributions of non-profits remain largely unexplored. Lurking in the 
background of these questions remain issues of international comparison. Do households in other 
wealthy democracies encounter the same level of material hardship as American households?  
There are a number of limitations to this dissertation. First, the collection of nationally 
representative statistics on various forms of material hardship appears to be entering an uncertain 
phase. The full-scale revision of the SIPP, starting with the 2014 panel, has eliminated the 
material hardship questions, thus making it difficult to extend this line of research going forward. 
Save for food insecurity measures, no nationally representative survey currently has material 
hardship measures.  
While I argue throughout this dissertation that material hardship measures should, at a 
minimum, be used in conjunction with income poverty measures, there are some conceptual 
limitations to this approach. Hardship measures do not capture the overall quality of life for a 
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household. They are agnostic as to the physical and mental health of the people in the household, 
do not measure the quality of the housing, food, or other resources enjoyed by members of the 
household, and do not speak to wider social conditions in which households are situated such as 
neighborhood quality, access to transportation, to recreation opportunities, and the like.  
 It is also possible that shared norms around the experience of material hardship may 
differ so widely by context that they are difficult to use in such a highly stratified society. For 
example, what one household considers an insufficient amount of food could be another’s feast. 
Likewise, an essential expense for one household could be considered a luxury in another. These 
measures were developed approximately ten years into the current inequality crisis, and may 
need to be re-evaluated in the context of increased stratification at the bottom of the income 
ladder. While material hardship measures are more individually targeted measures of well-being 
than the averaged costs of food, clothing, shelter, and utilities used by the SPM, hardship 
measures still contain within them some level of subjectivity that is difficult to eradicate. Could 
two theoretical households living under the same exact material conditions answer some of the 
material hardship questions in divergent ways? Yes, but this is a risk inherent in any empirical 
project that depends upon the self-reports of research subjects.  
 While this dissertation reports strong and persistent racial disparities in the experience of 
material hardship even when accounting for income, wealth, and education, the causes of these 
racial gaps remain obscure. Because the analysis used in this dissertation relies entirely on 
observed characteristics, there are a number of unobserved characteristics that could contribute 
to these findings. First, the SIPP does not directly measure the social ties of respondents. 
Network analysts in economic sociology have repeatedly shown the power of social networks in 
economic life (e.g. Granovetter 1983), including work on the intersection of social networks and 
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race (Royster 2003; Smith 2005). It is possible that the social ties in which black and white 
households are embedded transmit different mixtures of advantage and disadvantage (Park, 
Weimers, and Seltzer 2018) resulting in different material outcomes. 
 Second, it is likely that the underlying risk of experiencing negative shocks and events 
that drive households into a spell of material hardship are not evenly distributed across the 
population. If non-white households are more likely to be exposed to the shocks that drive a 
household into material hardship, even if the shocks effected households the same way, 
households of color would still exhibit higher rates of material hardship.  
Per chapter 4, we know that events do not result in such outcomes. Similar to Devah 
Pager’s (2003) resume audit study that finds black job seekers have the same chances of 
receiving an interview as white job seekers with a criminal record, I find that black households 
compete for material resources as if they were a white household experiencing unemployment, 
income shocks, additional children, a move, a divorce, or other disruptive events. A combination 
of network ties, underlying propensity to experience negative shocks, and disparate outcomes to 
those shocks could explain the racial disparities in material hardship. Finally, the long legacy of 
income and wealth destruction of black communities means these populations are simply not 
starting on an even playing field (Katznelson 2005; Sugrue 2005).   
The findings in this dissertation contain a number of implications for social work 
practice. First, interpersonal practice social workers may need to re-think how sliding scales are 
set. Instead of income alone, income volatility, the relatively fixed costs of larger expenses such 
as housing and debt, and measures of material hardship could be used as guidelines in setting up 
a sliding scale for clients and patients that takes into account more than just income.  
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The second key implication of social work practice is in how we evaluate our 
interventions. Social workers generally rely on a threefold biopsychosocial approach in 
understanding the wellbeing of those they work with. While much social scientific research 
needs to be done on the causes of material hardship, social workers practitioners may be 
uniquely situated to understand the biopsychosocial consequences of material hardship.  
The findings of this dissertation also have a number of implications for social policy. 
First, is a need to reconsider the needs-based, means-tested social policy approach that is the 
hallmark of the US welfare state. One implication of my findings is that “needs-based” and 
“means-tested”, while often used together, really need to be considered separately. If we as a 
society care about assisting those without means, specifically income, then our safety net works 
relatively well. If, on the other hand, we care about making sure the material needs of people are 
met, the safety net clearly fails in this regard.  
Perhaps it is time to move way from the targeted, liberal (in the Esping-Ansdersen sense) 
welfare state and towards a more universal, social democratic mode. The experiment in single 
payer health insurance and guaranteed incomes for senior citizens (Medicare and Social 
Security) has already shown that universal programs have a perhaps unique ability to reduce 
material hardship across the population.  
Third, we need to recognize that social policy is also a system of stratification—a way of 
determining who gets what and when. Without explicitly taking race, a durable and stratifying 
social structure, into account, it is unclear how our social policy efforts to eliminate material 
hardship will do anything other than reinforce existing racial hierarchies or at best fail to 
sufficiently reduce the existing, large racial gaps in material well-being shown here. The idea of 
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a race-based social policy may be discomforting, but it is one that we already have in practice 
(Lieberman 1998; Poole 2006; Schram et al. 2009).  
If poverty research were to move more towards an approach centered on material 
hardship, it may open up the possibility of fruitful dialogue between the political economy 
tradition of economic sociology and more traditional stratification research. Initially centered 
around questions about the role of social networks and organizations in economic life, economic 
sociology has broadened to include questions of political economy (Swedberg 2003). Recently 
some economic sociologists have moved further towards political sociology as they investigate 
the relationship between the state and the economy, particularly the ways in which the state 
manages consumer access to credit. 
Some of the ways in which economic sociology has moved towards questions of political 
economy have begun to address the issue of poverty. For example, Monica Prasad’s The Land of 
Too Much: American Abundance and the Paradox of Poverty (2012) seeks to explain why the 
US has higher poverty rates than European societies. A key component of her answer has to do 
with the ways in which policy makers have seen expanded consumer credit as an alternative to 
expanded direct social welfare provision. This political economic approach to questions of 
poverty is in line with Alice O’Connor’s call for new poverty knowledge, knowledge that 
embraces questions of political economy rather than narrower issues of welfare dependency, a 
poverty knowledge that, although she does not use the term, places the embedded nature of 
economic life at the center of analysis.  
Political sociologists have also been asking questions pertinent to poverty research, 
questions that dovetail with economic sociology’s newfound emphasis on political economy. For 
example, David Brady (2009) uses the Luxemburg Income Study to assess the relationship 
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between poverty and politics in wealthy democracies and argues that, fundamentally, poverty 
rates are a function of welfare state generosity. Lane Kenworthy’s extensive work (e.g. 2014) in 
the realm of comparative welfare states concurs with this conclusion. Institutional political 
scientist Jacob Hacker (2006) identified a number of policy changes that shift various forms of 
risk from the institutional level (governments, employers) to the household level. Fundamentally 
Brady, Kenworthy, and Hacker, like many economic sociologists, view concerns over the 
distribution of goods, resources, and risk through the lens of political economy.  
There is one quality of these political economy oriented works that should give scholars 
of the American welfare and poverty researchers pause: their tendency to approach issues of 
structural change from a national level. Historians, sociologists, and social workers have long 
pointed out the ways in which the American welfare state functions differently along the lines of 
race, gender, and class (see eg Danziger 2010; Fraser and Gordon 1994; Katz 2013; Katznelson 
2005). Esping-Andersen, makes a similar point in Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990) 
when he emphasizes that welfare states are not just means of redistribution, but are themselves 
systems of stratification. Perhaps nowhere is this more true that in the fragmented, disciplinary, 
half-hidden American welfare state. It is precisely this uneven distribution of welfare state 
support that drives many emerging trends within poverty research (Moffitt 2014). To understand 
changes in political economy at the macro level without investigating how they redistribute 
goods, resources, and risk within society is to miss at least half of the story. 
What does it mean to be poor in an affluent society? In the US today, to be poor means, 
for 18% of households, to be unable to meet your material needs but still not be seen or counted 
as poor. Rather, these households are hidden from the social safety net, from scholars, and from 
public discussion. What is at stake here is more than just who has the lights turned off, and who 
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is able to pay their bills. Per Sen and Roosevelt, material deprivation is about human freedom, 
about the ability to live the kind of life one values. Perhaps, if nearly half of households 
experience either material hardship, income poverty, or both, we should think of America as the 
land of the semi-free. To be hidden is to be invisible, and ultimately disposable (Block and 
Somers 2014).   
Polanyi’s The Great Transformation concludes with a meditation on freedom in a 
complex society. To understand freedom in a complex society, Polanyi argues, one must fully 
reckon with the reality of society. The freedom of classical liberals, the freedom of homo 
economicus, is a false freedom in a modern, complex society. In 2018, after a nearly forty year 
experiment with market fundamentalism, it is clear that for far too many Americans this type of 
freedom has produced material insecurity, invisibility, and possibly disposability. In other words, 
it has produced no freedom at all. Instead, a vision of freedom founded on social rights, such as a 
right to a job, would afford even the most non-conformist individual a niche in which to live 
without material hardship.  
It is my hope that this project can inform the work of social scientists, social workers, 
policy makers, and citizens as they engage in the long-term work of securing the material basis 
necessary for households to experience another new birth of freedom. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Measuring Income Volatility 
Income volatility is an important factor in considering the economic well-being of a 
household. From the 1970s to the present, there have been broad trends indicating an increase in 
various forms of economic insecurity (Western et al. 2012) and precarity for workers (Schram 
2015; Standing 2014). For large segments of the population, the day-to-day reality of these 
trends is marked by income instability. There is an extensive literature in economics regarding 
the proper way to measure income volatility. The literature breaks down into three main 
approaches: 1) autoregressive, 2) non-parametric, and 3) descriptive. Each approach has 
advantages and disadvantages. The literature is, on the whole, inconclusive regarding the 
existence of increased income volatility since the 1970s. Part of this may be due to the 
assumptions used in formal models, the top and bottom coding of data, and issues with common 
data sources.  
The literature on income volatility begins with Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994; 2009; 
2002). Addressing concepts proposed by Milton Friedman, Gottschalk and Moffitt decompose 
income into permanent income and transitory income. The idea behind this distinction is that 
there is some relatively stable “permanent” income that an individual earns over the long term. 
For example, this might be reflected in someone’s base wage or salary. Transitory income then 
would include any temporary fluctuation in income such as bonuses. Gottschalk and Moffitt’s 
primary goal in their papers is to create a formal model of income volatility that distinguished 
between permanent income and transitory income in order to investigate the broader and much 
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noted trend towards increasing income inequality nationally. To do so they have used two 
approaches, an autoregressive moving average model and a less complex approach in which the 
difference between actual log income is subtracted from mean log income over repeated same 
length time periods. Both approaches reveal a similar trend: increasing income volatility in the 
1970s and 1980s, a stable trend of high income volatility in the 1990s, and increasing volatility 
yet again in the 2000s. Gottschalk and Moffitt, along with nearly all other papers in this 
literature, use the PSID as their data source.  
Another approach to this problem has been developed by statisticians Jensen and Shore 
(2011). They develop a semiparametric Baysian approach they term a Markovian hierarchical 
Dirichlet process to model income volatility. As with Gottschalk and Moffitt, their motivation is 
to create a formal model of income volatility. Their main criticism of the autoregressive 
approach of Gottschalk and Moffitt is that their models assume that all individuals with the same 
demographic factors have the same volatility parameters and that there is no correlation between 
permanent income volatility and transitory income volatility. These criticisms of Gottshalk and 
Moffitt are intriguing and point towards the potential benefits of simpler approaches.  
Researchers working at the CBO (2008), Federal Reserve (2015), in think tanks (Dynan, 
Elmendorf, and Sichel 2013), and some economists tend to prefer simpler, less complex 
approaches to measuring income volatility.  Shin and Solon (2008) argue that the findings of 
more complex parametric models are extremely sensitive to model specification, thus calling in 
to doubt the rising trend of income volatility. In general, the less complex approaches tend to 
measure things like standard deviation in percentage change of income, fractions of households 
experiencing various percentage drops in income, and variation in income around average 
income (see tables 3a and 3b in Dynan et al 2012).  
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The US Financial Diaries Project headed by Jonathan Morduch (Morduch and Schneider 
2017) is a monthly survey of a non-nationally representative sample of low and moderate-
income households. The goal of this survey is to understand the dynamics of income instability 
in greater detail than is possible existing national surveys (often annual, or at best once every 4 
months). The Financial Diaries Projects reports the coefficient of variation (standard deviation of 
monthly household earnings divided by the mean of household earnings) to measure income 
instability and also examine spikes (monthly income above 125% of average income) and dips 
(monthly income below 75% of average). Their initial findings suggest that income instability is 
weakly correlated with low income, that there is a great deal of volatility in middle-income 
households as well. Most intriguingly, they find that non-labor income exhibits much higher 
variation than labor income. Presuming that this non-labor income is composed mainly of state 
transfers for the low to moderate-income population, this hints at the possibility that the current 
welfare state may increase income volatility. Their findings also indicate that, after attempting to 
deal with the issue of seam bias, the SIPP may produce overly conservative and low estimates of 
income instability.  
I use a less formal definition of income instability. I avoid the Gottschalk and Moffitt 
style decomposition of income into permanent and transitory earnings because the goal of this 
project is not to create a formal model of income dynamics but rather understand how unstable a 
given household’s income is prior to the measure of material hardship. There is another reason to 
avoid this approach, a rather practical reason. Papers that distinguish between permanent and 
transitory earnings tend to focus on shocks to transitory earnings as the expense of shocks to 
permanent earnings. At the household level, it is doubtful that such shocks are distinguishable by 
people attempting to pay their rent or utility bills. Income instability, whether due to changes in 
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“permanent” or “transitory” income is still income instability—a dollar is a dollar.  Many papers 
in this literature also exclude respondents with zero earnings, an approach I do not follow 
because it would by definition exclude the population of greatest interest. I use the coefficient of 
variation favored by Morduch and the Financial Diaries Project because it is straightforward, 
corrects for average income, and is more interpretable than logged income. 
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Appendix B: Material Hardship Over Time 
Data on material hardship are available for the years 1998, 2003, 2005, 2010, and 2011 in 
the SIPP. In general, all measures of material hardship follow a “U” shaped pattern in which 
hardship levels drop from 1998 to 2003, return to 1998 levels by 2005, and increase dramatically 
in 2010 and 2011. In general, 2003 is the year with the lowest rates of material hardship while 
2011 is the highest. 1998 and 2005 are somehwere in between them and 2010 is nearly identitcal 
to 2011. These time trends in material hardship are also explored in Heflin (2017). 
 Table B.1 Hardship and Poverty Over Time 
 1998 2003 2005 2010 2011 Percent Change 2003-
2011 
       
Hidden 
Hardship  
17.46  15.75  17.16  19.43  19.20  21.90 
SE (0.23) (0.24) (0.22) (0.23) (0.24)  
Down and Out 5.94  5.87  6.32  7.10  7.57  28.96 
SE (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16)  
Getting by  6.48  7.18  6.54  7.91  7.98  11.14 
SE (0.15) (0.17) (0.14) (0.16) (0.17)  
Economically 
Secure 
70.13  71.19  69.98  65.57  65.25  -8.34 
 
SE (0.28) (0.30) (0.27) (0.28) (0.29)  
Total  100  100  100  100  100   
 
 Table B.1 shows hardship and poverty status by year, and the percent change between 
2003 and 2011. The economically secure group the only one to shrink while the down and out 
and hidden hardship groups both grew by more than 20% between 2003 and 2011.  
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 Table B.2 Type of Hardship Over Time 
 1998 2003 2005 2010 2011 Percent 
Change 2003-
2011 
Difficulty Meeting 
Essential Expenses 
14.02  12.93  14.41  16.14  16.07  24.28 
SE (0.22) (0.23) (0.20) (0.22) (0.23)  
Missed rent or 
mortgage payment 
5.36  5.48  6.05  7.91  8.06  47.08 
SE (0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.16) (0.17)  
Evicted 0.26  0.29  0.25  0.41  0.51  75.86 
SE (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)  
Missed utility bills 9.14  8.66  9.83  10.41  10.54  21.71 
SE (0.18) (0.19) (0.17) (0.18) (0.19)  
Utility cut offs 1.32  1.52  1.71  1.76  1.74  14.47 
SE (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)  
Phone cut off 3.85  4.15  4.23  3.58  3.81  -8.19 
SE (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)  
Unable to see doctor 6.12  6.32  6.80  7.92  7.93  25.47 
SE (0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.16) (0.17)  
Unable to see dentist 7.90  7.56  8.51  9.60  9.89  30.82 
SE (0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18)  
Food insecure 9.05  8.14  8.99  10.94  11.47  40.91 
SE (0.18) (0.19) (0.16) (0.18) (0.20)  
 
All types of material hardship save for phone cut offs increased between 2003 and 2011. Missed 
housing payments, evictions, and food insecurity were the hardships with the greatest percentage 
change. These trends are consistent with the basic theoretical model of material hardship put 
forward by Mayer (1993)—that hardship occurs when demands exceed household resources. The 
greatest increases occur in types of hardship that are most sensitive to a cash squese, such as a 
missed housing payment, eviction, and food insecrity.  
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 Table B.3 Mean Hardship Count by Year 
 1998 2003 2005 2010 2011 Percent Change 
2003-2011 
       
Hidden Hardship 2.32  2.41  2.44  2.46  2.48  2.90 
SE (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 Down and Out  2.78  2.90  2.99  2.95  2.95  1.72 
SE (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
 No Poverty 0.46  0.44  0.48  0.56  0.56  27.27 
SE (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 Poor 1.33  1.30  1.47  1.40  1.44  10.77 
SE (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
 Total 0.57  0.55  0.61  0.69  0.70  27.27 
SE (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 2.90 
 The mean number of hardships reported by households has increased  fairly steadily for 
thouseholds in hidden hardship, up from 2.32 to 2.48. While mean hardship counts are higher for 
the down and out, the increase is smaller. The perent change mean hardship count for all 
households above the poverty line increased at a rate nearly tripple that of the increase for poor 
households.  
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Figure B.1 Predicted Probability of Hidden Hardship by Race and Year over Income 
 
Figure 1 shows the predicted probability of hidden hardship by year and race. With year 
comparisons consistently show racial disparities, but looking over time reveals that predicted 
probabilities by race differ considerably across years while maintaining the same relative 
disparities over time. While white households have lower predicted probababilities of material 
hardship than black households in both 2003 and 2011, black households in 2003 have 
essentially the same predicted probability of material hardship up and down the income ladder as 
white households in 2011.  
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Appendix C: Regression Tables for Chapter 4 
This appendix contains selected regression tables for the logistic regressions in Chapter 4.  
 Table C.1 Logistic Regression Estimates For Household Unemployment 
  
                                    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  
                                    b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Unemployment 
1.132*** 1.073*** 0.834*** 0.544*** 0.515*** 
  
                                    
0.055 0.057 0.059 0.064 0.065 
Race White Ref category 
  
                                    
 . . . . 
 
Black 
 0.872*** 0.552*** 0.517*** 0.404*** 
  
                                    
 0.056 0.06 0.063 0.064 
 
Asian 
 0.023 0.137 0.108 0.083 
  
                                    
 0.103 0.108 0.112 0.113 
 
Other 
 0.703*** 0.568*** 0.490*** 0.403*** 
  
                                    
 0.103 0.104 0.11 0.11 
 
Hispanic 
 0.788*** 0.373*** 0.340*** 0.252*** 
  
                                    
 0.061 0.067 0.071 0.07 
Education Less than HS 
Ref category 
  
                                    
  . . . 
 
High school 
  -0.273*** -0.240*** -0.188** 
  
                                    
  0.068 0.071 0.071 
 
Some College 
  -0.430*** -0.315*** -0.232*** 
  
                                    
  0.067 0.07 0.07 
 
BA 
  -1.124*** -0.846*** -0.696*** 
  
                                    
  0.081 0.085 0.086 
 
BA + 
  -1.343*** -0.969*** -0.797*** 
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  0.094 0.1 0.101 
Gender Male 
Ref category 
  
                                    
  . . . 
 
Female 
  0.165*** 0.127** 0.127** 
  
                                    
  0.04 0.042 0.042 
 
Age 
  0.033*** 0.058*** 0.073*** 
  
                                    
  0.008 0.008 0.008 
 
Age squared 
  -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  
                                    
  0 0 0 
 
Number of 
children  0.102*** 0.098*** 0.106*** 
  
                                    
  0.022 0.023 0.023 
Marital Status Married, 
spouse present Ref category 0 0 0 
  
                                    
  . . . 
 
Married, 
spouse absent  0.418** 0.171 0.085 
  
                                    
  0.156 0.164 0.163 
 
Widowed 
  0.360*** 0.220** 0.101 
  
                                    
  0.08 0.081 0.082 
 
Divorced 
  0.520*** 0.301*** 0.179** 
  
                                    
  0.056 0.06 0.062 
 
Separated 
  0.726*** 0.465*** 0.349** 
  
                                    
  0.113 0.121 0.119 
 
Never married 
  0.488*** 0.206** 0.143* 
  
                                    
  0.059 0.064 0.064 
 
Welfare state 
transfers   0.012*** 0.013*** 
  
                                    
   0.002 0.002 
 
Household 
income   -0.006*** -0.004*** 
  
                                    
   0.001 0.001 
 
CV of Income 
   0.656*** 0.737*** 
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   0.066 0.066 
 
Net Worth 
    -0.002*** 
  
                                    
    0 
 
Unsecured 
Debt    0.002*** 
  
                                    
    0 
 
Constant 
-1.718*** -1.939*** -1.939*** -2.313*** -2.782*** 
  
                                    
0.02 0.024 0.21 0.223 0.227 
  24969 24969 24969 23973 23973 
 
 Table C.2 Logistic Regression Estimates For Divorce7 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
                                      b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
                                           
  0 0 0 0 0 
Divorce No divorce . . . . . 
 Divorce 0.937*** 0.872*** 0.775*** 0.434*** 0.302* 
                                      0.106 0.111 0.111 0.118 0.12 
Race White  0 0 0 0 
  Black  0.953*** 0.777*** 0.707*** 0.564*** 
                                     0.108 0.109 0.114 0.116 
  Asian  0.221 0.324* 0.246 0.2 
                                     0.15 0.154 0.156 0.157 
  Other  0.557** 0.435* 0.378* 0.261 
                                     0.186 0.19 0.192 0.19 
  Hispanic  1.078*** 0.580*** 0.515*** 0.422*** 
                                     0.089 0.102 0.106 0.105 
                                                
7 Unlike other regressions in this series, regressions on divorce exclude a measure of marital status because the 
event in question—divorce—already measures marital status, albeit in a more truncated fashion.  
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Education Less than HS   0 0 0 
 High school   -0.363** -0.226* -0.172 
                                        0.111 0.114 0.113 
 Some College  -0.545*** -0.330** -0.240* 
                                        0.108 0.11 0.11 
 BA   -1.202*** -0.828*** -0.648*** 
                                        0.13 0.132 0.134 
 BA +   -1.409*** -0.898*** -0.676*** 
                                        0.149 0.155 0.155 
Gender Male   0 0 0 
  Female   0.160* 0.117 0.138* 
                                      0.063 0.064 0.065 
  Age   0.028* 0.065*** 0.085*** 
                                      0.014 0.016 0.016 
  Age squared   -0.000*** 
-0.001*** 
-0.001*** 
                                      0 0 0 
  Number of 
children 
  0.067* 0.061 0.072* 
                                      0.032 0.032 0.032 
  Welfare state 
transfers 
   0.015*** 0.015*** 
                                       0.003 0.003 
  Household 
income 
   -0.006*** -0.004*** 
                                       0.001 0.001 
  CV of Income    0.796*** 0.909*** 
                                       0.114 0.115 
  Net Worth     -0.002*** 
                                        0 
  Unsecured Debt     0.002*** 
                                        0 
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  Constant -1.993*** -2.242*** -1.781*** -2.465*** -3.162*** 
                                      0.032 0.038 0.381 0.397 0.406 
  11553 11553 11553 11506 11506 
 
 
 Table C.3 Logistic Regression Estimates For Disability 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
                                      
     
  No disability 0 0 0 0 0 
Disability 
 
. . . . . 
  Disability 0.806*** 0.760*** 0.642*** 0.448*** 0.385*** 
 
                                    0.048 0.05 0.053 0.059 0.06 
Race White 
 
0 0 0 0 
 
  
 
. . . . 
  Black 
 
0.869*** 0.544*** 0.514*** 0.404*** 
 
                                    
 
0.056 0.06 0.063 0.064 
  Asian 
 
0.096 0.183 0.134 0.106 
 
                                    
 
0.103 0.107 0.112 0.113 
  Other 
 
0.694*** 0.550*** 0.481*** 0.402*** 
 
                                    
 
0.101 0.103 0.11 0.11 
  Hispanic 
 
0.830*** 0.400*** 0.364*** 0.275*** 
 
                                    
 
0.06 0.067 0.07 0.07 
Education Less than HS 
  
0 0 0 
    
. . . 
  High school 
  
-0.211** -0.199** -0.155* 
 
                                    
 
0.069 0.072 0.072 
  Some College 
  
-0.357*** -0.265*** -0.192** 
 
                                    
 
0.067 0.07 0.07 
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  BA 
  
-1.022*** -0.779*** -0.643*** 
 
                                    
 
0.082 0.086 0.086 
 
BA + 
  
-1.247*** -0.905*** -0.747*** 
 
                                    
 
0.096 0.1 0.101 
Gender Male 
  
0 0 0 
    
. . . 
  Female 
  
0.149*** 0.118** 0.118** 
 
                                    
  
0.04 0.042 0.042 
  Age 
  
0.01 0.041*** 0.058*** 
 
                                    
  
0.008 0.009 0.009 
  Age squared 
  
-0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
                                    
  
0 0 0 
  Number of children 
 
0.120*** 0.113*** 0.120*** 
 
                                    
  
0.022 0.023 0.023 
Marital 
Status 
Married, spouse present 
 
0 0 0 
    
. . . 
  Married, spouse 
absent 
  
0.418** 0.167 0.081 
 
                                    
 
0.153 0.163 0.162 
  Widowed 
  
0.352*** 0.204* 0.089 
 
                                    
 
0.08 0.081 0.083 
  Divorced 
  
0.518*** 0.293*** 0.176** 
 
                                    
 
0.056 0.06 0.061 
  Separated 
  
0.733*** 0.459*** 0.346** 
 
                                    
 
0.111 0.119 0.118 
  Never married 
  
0.481*** 0.191** 0.132* 
 
                                    
 
0.059 0.064 0.063 
  Welfare state 
transfers 
   
0.010*** 0.011*** 
 
                                    
  
0.002 0.002 
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  Household 
income 
   
-0.006*** -0.004*** 
 
                                    
  
0.001 0.001 
  CV of Income 
   
0.765*** 0.840*** 
 
                                    
  
0.063 0.064 
  Net Worth 
    
-0.002*** 
                                      
   
0 
 
Unsecured 
Debt 
    
0.002*** 
 
                                    
   
0 
 
Constant -1.702*** -1.931*** -1.398*** -1.960*** -2.459*** 
 
                                    0.021 0.024 0.208 0.223 0.227 
 
N 24969 24969 24969 23973 23973 
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 Table C.4 Logistic Regression Estimates For Income Spikes 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
                                      b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
                                      
     
Income 
Spikes No income spike 0 0 0 0 0 
  
. . . . . 
Income spike 0.547*** 0.526*** 0.398*** 0.114* 0.204*** 
                                      0.049 0.05 0.051 0.055 0.056 
Race White 
 
0 0 0 0 
  
 
. . . . 
  Black 
 
0.907*** 0.566*** 0.479*** 0.380*** 
 
                                    0.056 0.06 0.06 0.061 
  Asian 
 
0.033 0.141 0.119 0.091 
 
                                    0.103 0.107 0.108 0.109 
  Other 
 
0.750*** 0.598*** 0.525*** 0.450*** 
 
                                    0.102 0.103 0.105 0.105 
  Hispanic 
 
0.814*** 0.373*** 0.311*** 0.229*** 
 
                                    0.06 0.067 0.067 0.067 
Education Less than HS 
  
0 0 0 
    
  
. . . 
 
High school 
  
-0.276*** -0.198** -0.161* 
                                      
  
0.068 0.069 0.069 
 
Some College 
 
-0.432*** -0.287*** -0.220** 
                                      
  
0.067 0.067 0.068 
 
BA 
  
-1.144*** -0.826*** -0.705*** 
                                      
  
0.081 0.083 0.084 
 
BA + 
  
-1.375*** -0.923*** -0.784*** 
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0.094 0.098 0.099 
Gender Male 
  
0 0 0 
  
  
. . . 
  Female 
  
0.158*** 0.123** 0.121** 
 
                                    
 
0.04 0.04 0.04 
  Age 
  
0.030*** 0.053*** 0.067*** 
 
                                    
 
0.008 0.008 0.008 
  Age squared 
  
-0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
                                    
 
0 0 0 
  Number of 
children 
  
0.108*** 0.098*** 0.109*** 
 
                                    
 
0.022 0.022 0.022 
Marital 
Status 
Married, spouse 
present 
  
0 0 0 
    
  
. . . 
 
Married, spouse absent 
 
0.366* 0.164 0.068 
                                      
  
0.152 0.154 0.153 
 
Widowed 
  
0.353*** 0.208** 0.103 
                                      
  
0.08 0.079 0.081 
 
Divorced 
  
0.533*** 0.311*** 0.202*** 
                                      
  
0.056 0.059 0.06 
 
Separated 
  
0.735*** 0.465*** 0.355** 
                                      
  
0.111 0.112 0.112 
 
Never married 
 
0.511*** 0.266*** 0.211*** 
                                      
  
0.059 0.061 0.061 
 
Welfare state transfers 
  
0.013*** 0.013*** 
                                      
   
0.002 0.002 
 
Household income 
  
-0.008*** -0.006*** 
                                      
   
0.001 0.001 
 
Net Worth 
    
-0.002*** 
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0 
 
Unsecured Debt 
   
0.002*** 
                                      
    
0 
 
Constant -1.675*** -1.909*** -1.814*** -1.739*** -2.220*** 
                                      0.021 0.025 0.207 0.209 0.213 
 
N 24969 24969 24969 24946 24946 
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 Table C.5 Logistic Regression Estimates For Additional Children 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
                                      b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
                                      
     
Event No additional kids 0 0 0 0 0 
  
. . . . . 
 
Additional kids 0.407*** 0.353*** 0.206*** 0.137* 0.087 
                                      0.057 0.058 0.061 0.066 0.066 
Race White 
 
0 0 0 0 
   
. . . . 
  Black 
 
0.904*** 0.560*** 0.517*** 0.404*** 
 
                                    0.056 0.059 0.063 0.063 
  Asian 
 
0.041 0.152 0.113 0.085 
 
                                    0.102 0.107 0.112 0.113 
  Other 
 
0.742*** 0.591*** 0.500*** 0.413*** 
 
                                    0.102 0.103 0.109 0.11 
  Hispanic 
 
0.813*** 0.372*** 0.340*** 0.251*** 
 
                                    0.06 0.067 0.07 0.07 
Education Less than HS 
  
0 0 0 
    
  
. . . 
 
High school 
  
-0.288*** -0.243*** -0.190** 
                                      
  
0.068 0.071 0.071 
 
Some College 
 
-0.445*** -0.315*** -0.231*** 
                                      
  
0.067 0.07 0.07 
 
BA 
  
-1.157*** -0.845*** -0.695*** 
                                      
  
0.081 0.085 0.086 
 
BA + 
  
-1.389*** -0.972*** -0.798*** 
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0.094 0.1 0.101 
Gender Male 
  
0 0 0 
    
. . . 
  Female 
  
0.162*** 0.121** 0.121** 
 
                                    
 
0.04 0.042 0.042 
  Age 
  
0.029*** 0.057*** 0.072*** 
 
                                    
 
0.008 0.008 0.008 
  Age squared 
  
-0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
                                    
 
0 0 0 
  Number of 
children 
  
0.099*** 0.095*** 0.105*** 
 
                                    
 
0.022 0.023 0.023 
Marital 
Status 
Married, spouse 
present 
  
0 0 0 
    
  
. . . 
 
Married, spouse 
absent 
 
0.398** 0.148 0.065 
                                      
  
0.154 0.163 0.162 
 
Widowed 
  
0.356*** 0.218** 0.096 
                                      
  
0.08 0.081 0.082 
 
Divorced 
  
0.547*** 0.312*** 0.188** 
                                      
  
0.056 0.06 0.061 
 
Separated 
  
0.771*** 0.475*** 0.356** 
                                      
  
0.11 0.118 0.118 
 
Never married 
 
0.533*** 0.219*** 0.152* 
                                      
  
0.059 0.064 0.063 
 
Welfare state 
transfers 
  
0.014*** 0.015*** 
                                      
   
0.002 0.002 
 
Household 
income 
  
-0.007*** -0.005*** 
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0.001 0.001 
 
CV of Income 
  
0.767*** 0.849*** 
                                      
   
0.064 0.064 
 
Net Worth 
    
-0.002*** 
                                      
    
0 
 
Unsecured Debt 
   
0.002*** 
                                      
    
0 
 
Constant -1.631*** -1.862*** -1.716*** -2.223*** -2.688*** 
                                      0.02 0.024 0.208 0.222 0.226 
 
N 24969 24969 24969 23973 23973 
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 Table C.6 Logistic Regression Estimates For Moving 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
                                      b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
                                      
     
Moving No moving 0 0 0 0 0 
  
. . . . . 
 
Moved 0.681*** 0.629*** 0.384*** 0.323*** 0.265*** 
                                      0.051 0.052 0.056 0.059 0.059 
Race White 
 
0 0 0 0 
   
. . . . 
  Black 
 
0.885*** 0.558*** 0.515*** 0.403*** 
 
                                    0.056 0.059 0.063 0.063 
  Asian 
 
0.036 0.155 0.116 0.087 
 
                                    0.103 0.107 0.112 0.113 
  Other 
 
0.698*** 0.572*** 0.485*** 0.402*** 
 
                                    0.102 0.103 0.109 0.11 
  Hispanic 
 
0.812*** 0.381*** 0.348*** 0.259*** 
 
                                    0.06 0.066 0.07 0.07 
Education Less than HS 
  
0 0 0 
    
  
. . . 
 
High school 
  
-0.274*** -0.235** -0.185** 
                                      
  
0.068 0.071 0.071 
 
Some College 
 
-0.442*** -0.312*** -0.232*** 
                                      
  
0.067 0.07 0.07 
 
BA 
  
-1.157*** -0.847*** -0.700*** 
                                      
  
0.081 0.085 0.086 
 
BA + 
  
-1.376*** -0.965*** -0.794*** 
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0.095 0.1 0.101 
Gender Male 
  
0 0 0 
    
. . . 
  Female 
  
0.158*** 0.118** 0.118** 
 
                                    
 
0.04 0.042 0.042 
  Age 
  
0.038*** 0.066*** 0.078*** 
 
                                    
 
0.008 0.009 0.009 
  Age squared 
  
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
                                    
 
0 0 0 
  Number of children 
  
0.113*** 0.107*** 0.114*** 
 
                                    
 
0.022 0.023 0.023 
Marital 
Status 
Married, spouse 
present 
  
0 0 0 
    
  
. . . 
 
Married, spouse 
absent 
 
0.364* 0.124 0.045 
                                      
  
0.155 0.164 0.163 
 
Widowed 
  
0.355*** 0.220** 0.1 
                                      
  
0.08 0.08 0.082 
 
Divorced 
  
0.516*** 0.288*** 0.170** 
                                      
  
0.056 0.06 0.061 
 
Separated 
  
0.726*** 0.441*** 0.330** 
                                      
  
0.11 0.118 0.117 
 
Never married 
 
0.512*** 0.207** 0.144* 
                                      
  
0.059 0.064 0.063 
 
Welfare state 
transfers 
  
0.014*** 0.014*** 
                                      
   
0.002 0.002 
 
Household income 
  
-0.006*** -0.005*** 
                                      
   
0.001 0.001 
 
CV of Income 
  
0.755*** 0.835*** 
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0.064 0.064 
 
Net Worth 
    
-0.002*** 
                                      
    
0 
 
Unsecured Debt 
   
0.002*** 
                                      
    
0 
 
Constant -1.684*** -1.910*** -2.002*** -2.498*** -2.909*** 
                                      0.02 0.024 0.215 0.23 0.233 
 
N 24969 24969 24969 23973 23973 
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Table C.7 Logistic Regression Estimates For Marriage 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
                                      b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
                                      
     
Marriage No change 0 0 0 0 0 
  
. . . . . 
 
Got marriaged 0.441*** 0.411*** 0.465*** 0.198 0.163 
                                      0.122 0.123 0.129 0.144 0.147 
Race White 
 
0 0 0 0 
   
. . . . 
  Black 
 
-0.338*** -0.229* -0.191* -0.135 
 
                                    0.086 0.091 0.095 0.095 
  Asian 
 0.404 
0.344 0.358 0.412 
 
                                    0.271 0.278 0.302 0.297 
  Other 
 
-0.227 -0.144 -0.098 -0.044 
 
                                    0.168 0.176 0.18 0.18 
  Hispanic 
 
-0.031 0.19 0.144 0.18 
 
                                    0.117 0.121 0.126 0.128 
Education Less than HS 
  
0 0 0 
    
  
. . . 
 
High school 
  
0.177 0.108 0.083 
                                      
  
0.117 0.12 0.121 
 
Some College 
 
0.257* 0.148 0.115 
                                      
  
0.113 0.116 0.117 
 
BA 
  
0.668*** 0.390* 0.319* 
                                      
  
0.144 0.159 0.161 
 
BA + 
  
1.219*** 0.844*** 0.742*** 
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0.185 0.202 0.208 
Gender Male 
  
0 0 0 
    
. . . 
  Female 
  
-0.166* -0.146 -0.126 
 
                                    
 
0.077 0.079 0.08 
  Age 
  
-0.092*** -0.100*** -0.103*** 
 
                                    
 
0.013 0.014 0.014 
  Age squared 
  
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
                                    
 
0 0 0 
  Number of 
children 
  
-0.101* -0.101* -0.109* 
 
                                    
 
0.046 0.048 0.049 
 
Welfare state transfers 
  
-0.004 -0.004 
                                      
   
0.004 0.004 
 
Household income 
  
0.010*** 0.008*** 
                                      
   
0.002 0.002 
 
CV of Income 
  
-0.246* -0.310** 
                                      
   
0.113 0.116 
 
Net Worth 
    
0.002*** 
                                      
    
0 
 
Unsecured Debt 
   
-0.001 
                                      
    
0.001 
 
Constant -0.548*** -0.461*** 1.173*** 1.231*** 1.373*** 
                                      0.036 0.045 0.348 0.364 0.365 
 
N 4449 4449 4449 4308 4308 
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Table C.8 Logistic Regression Estimates For Assistance from Family and Friends 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  
                                    
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
  
                                         
Help from 
Family and 
Friends 
No help 
0 0 0 0 0 
  
. . . . . 
 Help 
-0.704*** -0.693*** -0.595*** -0.533*** -0.518*** 
  
                                    
0.094 0.095 0.097 0.1 0.1 
Race White  
0 0 0 0 
   
. . . . 
  
Black  
-0.350*** -0.194* -0.151 -0.083 
                                     
0.072 0.076 0.079 0.079 
  
Asian  
0.214 0.031 0.047 0.093 
                                     
0.156 0.165 0.175 0.181 
  
Other  
-0.505*** -0.437** -0.391** -0.340* 
                                     
0.136 0.142 0.146 0.145 
  
Hispanic  
-0.218** -0.026 -0.011 0.028 
                                     
0.079 0.086 0.087 0.088 
Education Less than HS   
0 0 0 
      
. . . 
 High school   
0.214* 0.14 0.109 
  
                                      
0.088 0.09 0.09 
 Some College  
0.263** 0.151 0.105 
  
                                      
0.086 0.088 0.089 
 BA   
0.779*** 0.506*** 0.415*** 
  
                                      
0.107 0.115 0.116 
 BA +   
1.079*** 0.706*** 0.597*** 
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0.139 0.148 0.152 
Gender Male   
0 0 0 
    
. . . 
  
Female   
-0.146** -0.127* -0.118* 
                                      
0.056 0.057 0.057 
  
Age   
-0.077*** -0.091*** -0.096*** 
                                      
0.011 0.012 0.012 
  
Age squared   
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
                                      
0 0 0 
  
Number of children   
-0.064* -0.063* -0.068* 
                                      
0.03 0.031 0.031 
Marital Status Married, spouse 
present 
  
0 0 0 
      
. . . 
 Married, spouse 
absent 
 
-0.454* -0.3 -0.23 
  
                                      
0.221 0.23 0.228 
 Widowed   
-0.171 -0.054 0.004 
  
                                      
0.114 0.119 0.12 
 Divorced   
-0.459*** -0.263** -0.204* 
  
                                      
0.075 0.08 0.081 
 Separated   
-0.797*** -0.579*** -0.513*** 
  
                                      
0.152 0.157 0.156 
 Never married  
-0.393*** -0.190* -0.163 
  
                                      
0.078 0.085 0.086 
 Welfare state transfers   
-0.008** -0.007* 
  
                                       
0.003 0.003 
 Household income   
0.007*** 0.006*** 
  
                                       
0.001 0.001 
 CV of Income   
-0.199* -0.263** 
 136 
  
                                       
0.091 0.093 
 Net Worth     
0.001*** 
  
                                        
0 
 Unsecured Debt    
-0.001 
  
                                        
0.001 
 Constant 
-0.304*** -0.193*** 1.386*** 1.421*** 1.614*** 
  
                                    
0.027 0.033 0.312 0.324 0.325 
 N 
7482 7482 7482 7325 7325 
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Table C.9 Logistic Regression Estimates For Assistance from Social Services and Non-Profits 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  
                                    
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
  
                                        
Help from social 
services and non-
profits 
No help 
0 0 0 0 0 
  
. . . . . 
 Help 
-
0.911*** 
-
0.886*** 
-
0.768*** 
-
0.626*** 
-0.600*** 
  
                                    
0.117 0.118 0.12 0.123 0.123 
Race White  
0 0 0 0 
   
. . . . 
  
Black  
-
0.332*** 
-0.180* -0.144 -0.076 
                                     
0.072 0.076 0.079 0.079 
  
Asian  0.133 
-0.041 -0.017 0.03 
                                     
0.158 0.168 0.178 0.183 
  
Other  
-
0.528*** 
-0.458** -0.409** -0.358* 
                                     
0.137 0.143 0.146 0.146 
  
Hispanic  
-0.231** -0.045 -0.026 0.013 
                                     
0.08 0.087 0.088 0.089 
Education Less than HS   
0 0 0 
      
. . . 
 High school   
0.191* 0.123 0.093 
  
                                     
0.089 0.091 0.091 
 Some College  
0.254** 0.146 0.101 
  
                                     
0.087 0.089 0.089 
 BA   
0.767*** 0.503*** 0.413*** 
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0.107 0.115 0.117 
 BA +   
1.064*** 0.707*** 0.598*** 
  
                                     
0.139 0.149 0.152 
Gender Male   
0 0 0 
    
. . . 
  
Female   
-0.141* -0.127* -0.118* 
                                     
0.056 0.057 0.057 
  
Age   
-
0.075*** 
-
0.089*** 
-0.094*** 
                                     
0.011 0.012 0.012 
  
Age squared   
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
                                     
0 0 0 
  
Number of 
children 
  
-0.052 -0.054 -0.06 
                                     
0.03 0.031 0.031 
Marital Status Married, spouse 
present 
  
0 0 0 
      
. . . 
 Married, spouse 
absent 
 
-0.472* -0.31 -0.24 
  
                                     
0.223 0.233 0.23 
 Widowed   
-0.188 -0.062 -0.004 
  
                                     
0.115 0.12 0.121 
 Divorced   
-
0.465*** 
-
0.267*** 
-0.207* 
  
                                     
0.074 0.08 0.081 
 Separated   
-
0.804*** 
-
0.585*** 
-0.519*** 
  
                                     
0.151 0.156 0.156 
 Never married  
-
0.398*** 
-0.193* -0.166 
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0.079 0.086 0.086 
 Welfare state 
transfers 
  
-0.007* -0.006* 
  
                                      
0.003 0.003 
 Household 
income 
  
0.007*** 0.006*** 
  
                                      
0.001 0.001 
 CV of Income   
-0.222* -0.285** 
  
                                      
0.09 0.092 
 Net Worth     
0.001*** 
  
                                       
0 
 Unsecured Debt    
-0.001 
  
                                       
0.001 
 Constant 
-
0.312*** 
-
0.201*** 
1.323*** 1.367*** 1.561*** 
  
                                    
0.027 0.033 0.313 0.326 0.326 
 N 
7482 7482 7482 7325 7325 
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Table C.10 Logistic Regression Estimates For Job Gain 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
                                      b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
                                      
     
Job Gain No gain 0 0 0 0 0 
  
. . . . . 
Gain -0.246*** -0.227*** -0.168* -0.123 -0.116 
                                      0.069 0.069 0.071 0.076 0.076 
Race White 
 
0 0 0 0 
  
 
. . . . 
  Black 
 
-0.358*** -0.196** -0.158* -0.089 
 
                                    0.071 0.076 0.078 0.079 
  Asian 
 
0.162 -0.024 -0.001 0.046 
 
                                    0.158 0.168 0.178 0.183 
  Other 
 
-0.514*** -0.444** -0.398** -0.346* 
 
                                    0.135 0.142 0.146 0.146 
  Hispanic 
 
-0.214** -0.024 -0.01 0.03 
 
                                    0.079 0.086 0.087 0.088 
Education Less than HS 
  
0 0 0 
    
  
. . . 
 
High school 
  
0.216* 0.141 0.109 
                                      
  
0.088 0.09 0.091 
 
Some College 
 
0.273** 0.157 0.11 
                                      
  
0.086 0.089 0.089 
 
BA 
  
0.800*** 0.520*** 0.428*** 
                                      
  
0.107 0.115 0.116 
 
BA + 
  
1.112*** 0.732*** 0.620*** 
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0.139 0.149 0.152 
Gender Male 
  
0 0 0 
  
  
. . . 
  Female 
  
-0.156** -0.137* -0.128* 
 
                                    
 
0.056 0.057 0.057 
  Age 
  
-0.076*** -0.090*** -0.095*** 
 
                                    
 
0.011 0.012 0.012 
  Age squared 
  
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
                                    
 
0 0 0 
  Number of 
children 
  
-0.062* -0.062* -0.067* 
 
                                    
 
0.03 0.031 0.031 
Marital 
Status 
Married, spouse 
present 
  
0 0 0 
    
  
. . . 
 
Married, spouse absent 
 
-0.492* -0.328 -0.257 
                                      
  
0.222 0.231 0.229 
 
Widowed 
  
-0.202 -0.074 -0.014 
                                      
  
0.114 0.119 0.12 
 
Divorced 
  
-0.482*** -0.280*** -0.218** 
                                      
  
0.074 0.08 0.081 
 
Separated 
  
-0.816*** -0.589*** -0.521*** 
                                      
  
0.151 0.156 0.155 
 
Never married 
 
-0.408*** -0.199* -0.171* 
                                      
  
0.078 0.085 0.086 
 
Welfare state transfers 
  
-0.008** -0.007* 
                                      
   
0.003 0.003 
 
Household income 
  
0.007*** 0.006*** 
                                      
   
0.001 0.001 
 
CV of Income 
  
-0.203* -0.269** 
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0.091 0.093 
 
Net Worth 
    
0.001*** 
                                      
    
0 
 
Unsecured Debt 
   
-0.001 
                                      
    
0.001 
 
Constant -0.323*** -0.213*** 1.336*** 1.367*** 1.563*** 
                                      0.029 0.034 0.311 0.323 0.324 
 
N 7482 7482 7482 7325 7325 
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Table C.11 Logistic Regression Estimates For Upward Income Spikes 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
                                      b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
                                      
     
Income 
Spikes 
No income spike 0 0 0 0 0 
  
. . . . . 
 
Income spike -0.092 -0.094 -0.048 -0.197* -0.183* 
                                      0.07 0.07 0.071 0.077 0.078 
Race White 
 
0 0 0 0 
   
. . . . 
  Black 
 
-0.368*** -0.203** -0.153* -0.089 
 
                                    0.071 0.076 0.077 0.078 
  Asian 
 
0.16 -0.027 -0.038 0.001 
 
                                    0.157 0.168 0.176 0.18 
  Other 
 
-0.526*** -0.453** -0.390** -0.344* 
 
                                    0.136 0.142 0.144 0.144 
  Hispanic 
 
-0.220** -0.026 0.011 0.049 
 
                                    0.079 0.086 0.087 0.088 
Education Less than HS 
  
0 0 0 
    
  
. . . 
 
High school 
  
0.211* 0.14 0.112 
                                      
  
0.089 0.09 0.09 
 
Some College 
 
0.268** 0.158 0.119 
                                      
  
0.086 0.088 0.089 
 
BA 
  
0.801*** 0.511*** 0.427*** 
                                      
  
0.107 0.115 0.116 
 
BA + 
  
1.103*** 0.733*** 0.638*** 
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0.138 0.148 0.152 
Gender Male 
  
0 0 0 
    
. . . 
  Female 
  
-0.156** -0.119* -0.108 
 
                                    
 
0.056 0.056 0.057 
  Age 
  
-0.075*** -0.091*** -0.096*** 
 
                                    
 
0.011 0.012 0.012 
  Age squared 
  
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
                                    
 
0 0 0 
  Number of 
children 
  
-0.063* -0.060* -0.065* 
 
                                    
 
0.03 0.03 0.03 
Marital 
Status 
Married, spouse 
present 
  
0 0 0 
    
  
. . . 
 
Married, spouse absent 
 
-0.492* -0.281 -0.213 
                                      
  
0.221 0.224 0.222 
 
Widowed 
  
-0.197 -0.042 0.01 
                                      
  
0.114 0.118 0.119 
 
Divorced 
  
-0.481*** -0.281*** -0.230** 
                                      
  
0.074 0.08 0.081 
 
Separated 
  
-0.816*** -0.562*** -0.505** 
                                      
  
0.151 0.154 0.154 
 
Never married 
 
-0.411*** -0.174* -0.156 
                                      
  
0.078 0.084 0.085 
 
Welfare state transfers 
  
-0.008** -0.007* 
                                      
   
0.003 0.003 
 
Household income 
  
0.008*** 0.007*** 
                                      
   
0.001 0.001 
 
Net Worth 
    
0.001*** 
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0 
 
Unsecured Debt 
   
-0.001** 
                                      
    
0 
 
Constant -0.354*** -0.237*** 1.292*** 1.263*** 1.419*** 
                                      0.028 0.035 0.312 0.318 0.319 
 
N 7482 7482 7482 7463 7463 
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